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Comment
"Shopping" for Defendants: Market Liability
Under the Illinois Drug Dealer Liability Act
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 11, 1995, Illinois Governor Jim Edgar signed into law
the Drug Dealer Liability Act,' creating civil liability for illegal drug
dealing based on a market share theory.' The avowed purpose of the
Act was to place the cost of damages caused by the illegal drug market
on those who profit from that market.3 Thus, a person who suffers a
personal or pecuniary injury because of a drug user can now institute a
cause of action against a drug dealer.4 The Act does not require proof
that the dealer sold the drugs that caused the plaintiff's injury because
the Act specifically provides for a "market liability" theory.5 Under
this theory, which is notably distinct from other market share theo-
ries,6 a drug dealer can be liable to anyone who is injured by a drug
user within the geographic area where the dealer sold drugs.7 Essen-
tially, potential plaintiffs can go down to their local courthouse and get
the name of a convicted drug dealer in their geographic area, bring a
1. Illinois Drug Dealer Liability Act, Pub. Act No. 89-293, 1995 Iii. Legis. Serv.
3156-62 (West) (codified at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 57/1-85 (West Supp.
1996)).
2. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 57/25(b) (West Supp. 1996). The Act creates a
form of market share liability whereby an individual who is injured as a result of the drug
use of another person can sue anyone putting illegal drugs into the market, provided that
the person was putting illegal drugs into the market in the same geographic area and at
the same time that the drug user was buying drugs. Id. See infra part III.B for details on
the Act's market share theory.
3. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 57/10 (West Supp. 1996). The Act states the
purpose as follows:
The civil justice system can provide an avenue of compensation for those who
have suffered harm as a result of the marketing and distribution of illegal
drugs. The persons who have joined the illegal drug market should bear the
cost of the harm caused by that market in the community.
Id, § 57/10(2).
4. Id. § 57/25(b)(1). This claim parallels traditional common law claims.
5. Id. § 57/25(b)(2).
6. See infra part II.B.
7. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 57/40 (West Supp. 1996).
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lawsuit against that convicted dealer, and recover all of their damages
from that drug dealer.8
Illinois is not the first state to establish a drug dealer liability law.
Four other states have recently enacted nearly identical statutes.9 In
Michigan, for example, a court recently awarded two plaintiffs a $9
million default judgment against two convicted drug dealers.' 0
Undoubtedly, public frustration over the nation's drug problem moti-
vated the Illinois General Assembly to enact the Drug Dealer Liability
Act." The Act, however, violates several constitutional provisions.' 2
Additionally, the Drug Dealer Liability Act deviates from traditional
Illinois tort law and undermines fundamental principles inherent in our
system of justice. 3
This Comment first examines the traditional common law tort
requirement that a plaintiff must prove a causal link between his or her
injury and the defendant's wrongful conduct. 14 Next, this Comment
explores the expansion of common law principles to include market
share liability" and the Illinois Supreme Court's previous rejection of
8. As long as the convicted drug dealer sold the same type of drugs at the same time
and in the same area as where the injury was caused, he is liable for the plaintiff's dam-
ages. Id. §. 57/25(b)(2). The Act expressly precludes convicted drug dealers from deny-
ing their participation in the drug market. Id. § 57/60(b). Thus, as long as the plaintiff
can satisfy the minimal requirements of the Act, he or she is essentially guaranteed a
judgment against a drug dealer, regardless of whether that drug dealer actually had any-
thing to do with causing his injury. Further, unlike judicially devised market share
theories, the Drug Dealer Liability Act does not provide for apportionment of damages
in accordance with the defendant's market share. See id. § 57/25(b).
9. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-124 (Michie Supp. 1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 4-36-
663D-3 (1995); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1601 (West Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, §§ 2-421-435 (West Supp. 1996). See infra part II.D for a detailed discus-
sion of these statutes.
10. Ficano v. Clemens, No. 95-512918 (Cir. Ct. Wayne County Mich. 1995). See
infra notes 85-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of Ficano v. Clemens.
11. Representative Al Salvi, the law's sponsor, stated that "[p]eople would like to see
accountability particularly with regards to the problem of drugs .... I'm trying to deal
with it on a level where we have the power to sue, go after the pocketbooks of the drug
dealers." ILLINOIS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, REPORT TO THE 89TH
GEN. ASSEMBLY (Audio tape 1995) [hereinafter HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMrFrEE REPORT].
See also Michael McQueen & David Shribman, Battle Against Drugs Is Chief Issue
Facing Nation, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 1989, at AI (reporting that many Americans are
willing to try "almost anything" to solve the nation's drug problem).
12. See infra part IV. The Act creates an irrebuttable presumption of liability, in vio-
lation of the defendants' due process rights. See infra part IV.A.I. The Act also violates
the proscription against multiple punishment contained in the Double Jeopardy Clause.
See infra part IV.A.2.
13. See infra part IV.B.
14. See infra part II.A.
15. See infra part II.B.
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that doctrine.' 6 This Comment then highlights four states that enacted
laws imposing a form of market share liability on drug dealers 7 and
examines some of the constitutional issues raised by these laws. s
After discussing the general legal issues underlying drug dealer
liability laws, this Comment examines the legislative history of the Illi-
nois Drug Dealer Liability Act 9 and explains the recovery provisions
of the Act.20 This Comment then analyzes three potential challenges to
the Act: that it violates due process requirements by raising an irra-
tional presumption of the defendant's liability; 2' that it violates the
multiple punishment prong of the Double Jeopardy Clause by impos-
ing a second punishment on defendants with criminal convictions; 22
and that it abrogates traditional common law principles, which are vital
to the fair administration of justice.23 Lastly, this Comment proposes
constitutional alternatives that will not only enable the legislature to
meet its goal of compensating victims of the illegal drug trade but will
ensure the integrity of due process guarantees afforded to every mem-
ber of society, including drug dealers.24
II. BACKGROUND
Illinois and other states enacted drug dealer liability acts, in part,
because legislators perceived the common law as affording an inade-
quate basis for compensating the victims of drug users2 . This Part
first provides an overview of some of the common law claims that vic-
tims of drug users may assert and explains why those claims are likely
to fail against dealers who sold drugs to the user.26 This Part then
explores common law market share liability theories, which some
courts have adopted in special circumstances to expand the reach of
tort liability past traditional causation concepts.27 Next, this Part gives
a brief overview of drug dealer market share liability statutes enacted in
16. See infra part II.C.
17. See infra part I1.D.
18. See infra part II.E.
19. See infra part IiI.A.
20. See infra part III.B.
21. See infra part V.A.1.
22. See infra part IV.A.2.
23. See infra part IV.B.
24. See infra part V.
25. See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 57/10(7) (West Supp. 1996).
26. See infra part II.A.
27. See infra part IIB-C.
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four other states. 2s Finally, this Part examines some of the constitu-tional issues raised by these laws.29
A. Recovery Against Drug Dealers Under the Common Law
In theory, people injured by a drug user can bring common law civil
claims against the dealer who sold the user the drugs.30 Three com-
mon law claims are particularly relevant: negligence, strict liability for
abnormally dangerous activities, and strict products liability.3 Under
each of these tort theories, however, the third party victim generally
fails to prove all elements of the claim.32 Often, the plaintiff suing the
drug dealer for a tort committed by a drug user faces serious difficulty
in proving the causal link required in a common law tort claim. In a
negligence action, for instance, the plaintiff must prove a reasonable
connection between the defendant's act or omission and the damages
suffered by the plaintiff.33 Similarly, in both strict liability for abnor-
mally dangerous activities and strict products liability, the plaintiff
must establish some causal relationship between the defendant and the
injury-producing agent.'
28. See infra part ll.D.
29. See infra part II.E.
30. See, e.g., Prete v. Laudano, No. 337966, 1993 WL 21417 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan.
25, 1993). In Prete, the court refused to dismiss a claim against a drug dealer for injuries
inflicted by one of his customers based on strict liability theory. Id. at *1. See infra
notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
3 1. Michael E. Bronfin, Comment, "Gram Shop" Liability: Holding Drug Dealers
Civilly Liable for Injuries to Third Parties and Underage Purchasers, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 345, 346.
32. Id.
33. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 263
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS]. To constitute "proximate
cause," the injury must be the natural and probable result of the negligence and must be
of such a character as an ordinarily prudent person ought to have foreseen its probable
occurrence. Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 117 N.E.2d 74, 78-79 (I11. 1954). It is not essen-
tial that the person charged with negligence foresaw the precise injury which resulted
from his act. Id. at 78.
An intervening act, however, will break the causal connection between the original
wrong and the injury, unless the intervening cause was itself probable or foreseeable.
Id. This rule applies with equal force to criminal acts. Id. Thus, if at the time of the neg-
ligence, the criminal act might reasonably have been foreseen, the criminal act will not
break the causal chain. Id.
34. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 33, § 103, at 713. The plaintiff in a
strict liability action has the burden of proving that the "claimant's injury or illness was
attributable to a dangerous condition of a product identified as being one that was sup-
plied by the target defendant, either as a manufacturer or some other seller or supplier in
the marketing chain." Id.
Additional prima facie elements of different strict liability theories could also typi-
cally defeat a plaintiff's recovery. First, under the claim of strict liability for abnor-
1026 [Vol. 27
1996] The Illinois Drug Dealer Liability Act 1027
Causation normally requires identification of the tortfeasor.35 A
fundamental principle of tort law holds that a plaintiff cannot recover
unless he or she shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the
named defendant caused the injury; mere conjecture or speculation is
insufficient.36 Courts require identification of the tortfeasor as a pre-
requisite to recovery for several reasons.3 7 The identification require-
ment separates culpable parties from innocent actors 38 and ensures that
culpable parties are held liable only for injuries they actually caused.39
The identification requirement also prevents over-deterrence of useful
activities. 40
These requirements generally preclude a third-party victim from
recovering against a drug dealer. For example, a person mugged by a
drug user may wish to sue the dealer who sold drugs to his attacker.
mally dangerous activities, the plaintiff would have to prove that drug-dealing is an
abnormally dangerous activity. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977). Under
this theory, courts have generally confined liability to such activities as blasting, stor-
ing explosives, and aerial spraying. Bronfin, supra note 31, at 348. See also Doe v.
Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1398 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (refusing to declare sexual activ-
ity transmitting HIV an abnormally dangerous activity because it was outside the scope
of the doctrine, which covers only "blasting, storing of inflammable liquids, etc.").
One court has allowed a third-party victim to proceed against a drug dealer based on an
ultrahazardous activity theory. Prete, 1993 WL 21417, at *1. See supra note 30. How-
ever, case law suggests that most courts would be reluctant to extend liability by recog-
nizing drug-dealing as an abnormally dangerous activity. Bronfin, supra note 31, at
348.
Second, under the claim of strict products liability, the plaintiff must prove that the
drugs sold by the defendant were in some way defective. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A(l) (1965). Courts are unlikely, however, to permit recovery for an injury
caused by a product exchanged through an illegal transaction. Bronfin, supra note 31, at
350.
35. Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 329 (111. 1990).
36. Id. at 328.
37. Id. at 329. The Smith court held: "The identification element of causation in fact
serves an important .function in tort law." Id.
38. Payton v. Abbott Labs., 437 N.E.2d 171, 188 (Mass. 1982). In Payton, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court rejected the market share liability theory because it did not
require identification of the actual tortfeasor. Id.
39. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 33, § 41, at 264. "Proximate cause"
represents the limitation which the courts have placed upon the actor's responsibility
for the consequences of his conduct. Id. Professors Prosser and Keeton note: "In a
philosophical sense, the consequences of an act go forward to eternity, and the causes of
an event go back to the dawn of human events, and beyond." Id. For practical reasons,
though, liability could not be imposed for all actions. Id. Rather, legal responsibility
must be limited to closely connected causes that are important enough that the law is jus-
tified in imposing liability. Id. This limitation is based on such policy considerations
as justice and administrative efficiency. id.
40. Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 329. See, e.g., id. at 341 (explaining that market share
theories, which partially dispense with the causation requirement, force defendants to
insure against industry-wide losses).
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Under the common law, the plaintiff would have to identify the par-
ticular dealer and establish a causal link between the dealer's drug-
dealing and the plaintiff' s injury.4 Proving these elements would be
extremely difficult in the absence of a criminal conviction against either
the user or the drug dealer.42 Moreover, even where the user has been
convicted, he may not know the identity of the person who sold him
the drugs, or he may refuse to cooperate with the victim in locating the
dealer. Therefore, the plaintiff would encounter difficulties using
traditional tort doctrines to recover damages for injuries arising from
the sale of illegal drugs.43
B. The Origins of Market Share Liability
Market share theories have aided plaintiffs by lessening the burden
of proving a causal link between the specific injuries suffered by the
plaintiff and the named defendant. Under traditional common law tort
claims, the plaintiff retains the burden of proving that the defendant
caused the plaintiff's injury.44 Nonetheless, some courts have
departed from this long-standing rule because of the difficulty in
proving causation in some circumstances.45 These courts instead have
applied the market share theory of liability. 6 Under this theory, once
the plaintiff proves that the "true" tortfeasor probably includes the
named defendants, the burden shifts to each defendant to prove that he
or she could not have caused the plaintiff's injuries.47
The California Supreme Court first established market share liability
in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.48 In Sindell, the plaintiff alleged
41. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 33, § 41, at 263. See supra note
33 and accompanying text.
42. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 57/10(7) (West Supp. 1996) (noting that,
unlike the chain of distribution of legitimate products, the drug distribution system is
largely clandestine).
43. Bronfin, supra note 31, at 345. "[Tlraditional common law doctrines fail both to
deter potential drug dealers and to provide adequate means of recovery to the victims of
these dealers." Id. at 346.
44. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
45. See e.g., infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
46. The concepts underlying market share liability stemmed from the 1948 decision
in Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d I (Cal. 1948). In Summers, one of two negligent hunters
injured the plaintiff. Id. at 1-2. However, because they shot simultaneously from the
same direction and with identical guns, the plaintiff could not determine which of the
two defendants injured him. Id. at 4. However, the court held that, as between an inno-
cent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the defendants should bear the burden of proving
their non-participation in the injury. Id. Thus, the court shifted the burden to each
defendant to prove that his conduct could not have caused the plaintiffs injury. Id.
47. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
48. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). See Kathleen Strickland
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that she developed cancer as a result of her mother's ingestion of
diethylstilbestrol ("DES") during pregnancy. 49 Although the plaintiff
could not identify the specific manufacturer, the court created the mar-
ket share liability rule to allow the plaintiff to recover from all
manufacturers of DES, in proportion to their share of the DES
market. 50 The court's theory of liability required the plaintiff to join
those defendants who, taken together, held a "substantial share" of the
national DES market. 5' The defendants could then exculpate
themselves by showing that they could not have produced the DES that
injured the plaintiff.52 Otherwise, the defendants would be held liable
in proportion to their respective market shares.53
The Sindell court based its adoption of market share liability on
three policy considerations.54 First, the court stated that the negligent
defendant, rather than an innocent plaintiff, should bear the cost of the
injury. 5 Second, the court asserted that the manufacturer was in a
better position to bear the cost of the injury than the victim.56 Third,
& John P. Katemdahl, An Overview Of The Development Of Market Share Liability, in
Toxic TORT CASE ESSENTIALS: STRATEGIES, EXPERTS, MOTIONS, AND ADR 1992, at 227,
282-85 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 446, 1992).
49. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 925. Plaintiff represented a class of women who alleged that
DES, a synthetic hormone, was administered to their mothers while they were pregnant
with the plaintiffs for the purpose of preventing miscarriages. Id. The class claimed
that they were injured as a result. Id. The named plaintiff claimed that she developed a
form of cancer known as adenocarcinoma, which manifests itself after a minimum latent
period of 10 years. Id.
50. Id. at 936. The court stated: "Where, as here, all defendants produced a drug from
an identical formula and the manufacturer of the DES which caused plaintiffs injuries
cannot be identified through no fault of plaintiff, a modification of the rule of Summers
rationale is warranted." Id.
5 1. Id. at 937. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants, taken together, produced
roughly 90% of the DES market. Id. The court explained that if the plaintiff could estab-
lish this fact, the injustice of shifting the burden of proof to defendants to demonstrate
that they could not have made the substance that injured the plaintiff was significantly
diminished. Id. The court did not quantify what constituted a "substantial" share. Id.
52. See, e.g., id. In Sindell, one defendant was dismissed after it filed a declaration
that it did not manufacture DES until after the plaintiff was born. Id.
53. Id. The court held: "Each defendant will be held liable for the proportion of the
judgment represented by its share of that market unless it demonstrates that it could not
have made the product which caused plaintiff's injuries." Id.
54. Id. at 936.
55. Id. The court noted that in the instant case, as in Summers, the plaintiff was not
at fault for failing to provide evidence of causation. Id. Although the absence of such
evidence also could not be attributed to the defendants, their conduct in marketing a drug
that had delayed effects played a significant role in creating the unavailability of proof.
Id.
56. Id. The cost of an injury may be an "overwhelming misfortune" to the injured
person, whereas the manufacturer can distribute the cost among the public. Id.
1030 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 27
the court maintained that placing increased liability upon manufacturers
would act as an incentive to enhance product safety.
After Sindell, several other states adopted variations of the market
share theory. These variations all substantially ease the plaintiff's
burden of proving that a particular defendant caused the injury.59 State
57. Id. In a strong dissent, Justice Richardson criticized the majority's expansion of
traditional tort liability. Id. at 938 (Richardson, J., dissenting). He pointed out that
under market share liability, the plaintiff can recover from a defendant even though the
mathematical probability that the defendant caused the plaintiff's injury is low. Id. at
939 (Richardson, J., dissenting). He argued that it was "wholly speculative and conjec-
tural" whether any of the manufacturers named in the suit had actually made the drug that
caused the plaintiffs injury. Id. (Richardson, J., dissenting). Thus, he concluded that
the majority's market share theory improperly rejected more than 100 years of tort law,
which previously required "matching" a defendant's conduct to the plaintiffs injury as
absolutely essential. Id. (Richardson, J., dissenting). Justice Richardson relied on the
words of Dean Prosser:
[Plaintiff] must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the
conclusion that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was
a substantial factor in bringing about the result. A mere possibility of such
causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation
or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the
duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant.
Id. at 940 (Richardson, J., dissenting) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OFTORTS § 41, at 241 (4th ed. 1971)).
58. See, e.g., Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1990) (stating that the
theory allows the plaintiff to bring suit against any manufacturer after showing a gen-
uine attempt to locate and identify the particular manufacturer responsible for the
injury); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y.) (holding that under the
theory, defendants who sold DES for pregnancy use cannot exculpate themselves, even if
they can prove that their product could not have caused the plaintiff's injury), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989); Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984)
(stating that the theory creates a rebuttable presumption that other defendants have an
equal market share and are proportionally liable); Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 342
N.W.2d 37 (Wis.) (requiring that plaintiff only need commence suit against one defen-
dant who manufactured DES, but the defendant may implead other potentially responsi-
ble defendants), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984). For a discussion of these and other
cases, see Andrew B. Nace, Market Share Liability: A Current Assessment of a Decade-
Old Doctrine, 44 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1991).
Only one federal district court has adopted market share liability in the same form as
California. See McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 564 F. Supp. 265, 270 (D. S.D. 1983).
Most federal courts addressing the issue have declined to apply market share theories in
the absence of any clear direction from the state's supreme court. See, e.g., Tidler v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 851 F.2d 418, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (reasoning that the market share the-
ory requires "that we build on a new foundation, not on the structural underpinnings of
the traditional common law of torts"); Morton v. Abbott Labs., 538 F. Supp. 593, 599
(M.D. Fla. 1982) (noting that market share liability "unquestionably represents a radical
departure from the traditional concepts of causation" and that there was no indication
that Florida would abandon such a fundamental principle); Pipon v. Burroughs-Wellcome
Co., 532 F. Supp. 637, 639 (D. N.J.) (noting that there was no indication that the New
Jersey Supreme Court would deviate from the causation requirement), aff'd, 696 F.2d 984
(3d Cir. 1982).
59. See supra note 58.
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courts that have adopted a market share theory generally limit its appli-
cation to cases involving pharmaceuticals. 6° Some of these states have
also applied the market share liability theory to cases involving other
products.6' While much controversy surrounds the market share the-
ory and its use by an increasing number of states, the United States
Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the constitutionality of market
share liability.62
C. Market Share Liability in Illinois
The Illinois Supreme Court has refused to adopt any form of market
share liability. In Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co.,63 the court expressly
rejected the market share liability theory.64 In Smith, the plaintiff
60. See David M. Schultz, Market Share Liability In DES Cases: The Unwarranted
Erosion of Causation In Fact, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 771 (1991). A number of states that
did not adopt market share theories in the DES context also rejected the doctrine with
respect to other products. See Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 721 F. Supp. 89 (D. Md.
1989) (holding that even assuming Maryland recognized market share liability, the
theory would not apply to breast implant cases), aff'd, 898 F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1990);
Shackil v. Lederle Labs., 561 A.2d 511 (N.J. 1989) (rejecting the market share theory in
case involving diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus ("DPT") vaccine where the state had not
previously adopted market share theory); Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 514
N.E.2d 691 (Ohio 1987) (rejecting market share theory in asbestos case where state had
not adopted market share doctrine); Cummins v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 495 A.2d
963 (Pa. 1985) (rejecting market share theory in case involving multipiece truck wheels
where state had not adopted market share theory). In determining whether market share
liability should be applied, most courts look to the "fungibility" of the product. Note,
Presumed Innocent: Illinois' Rejection of Market Share Liability in Smith v. Eli Lilly &
Company is 'Cause in Fact' To Celebrate, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 869, 871-72 n.2
(1991). Fungible goods are defined by the Uniform Commercial Code as "goods ... of
which any unit is, by nature or usage of trade, the equivalent of any other unit." Id.
(citing U.C.C. § 201(17) (1991)). The fungible nature of certain products made by dif-
ferent manufacturers is what allows the imposition of market share liability. Id.
61. See, e.g., Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 667 F. Supp. 1332 (C.D. Cal. 1987)
(applicable to DPT vaccine); Ray v. Cutter Labs., 754 F. Supp. 193 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
(applicable to blood products); Wheeler v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 109
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (applicable to asbestos); City of New York v. Lead Indus. Ass'n,
597 N.Y.S.2d 698 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (applicable to lead paint).
See also Florida Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act, FLA. STAT. ch. 409.910 (West
1993 & Supp. 1996), which allows the state to sue the tobacco industry and other prod-
uct manufacturers to recover Medicaid payments attributable to product-related injuries
based on a market share liability theory. Id. The tobacco industry and other large busi-
nesses have received strong support in the Florida legislature for repeal of the law. Bill
Moss, Crime Bills May Stall In House Series, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 21, 1995, at
5B.
62. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (denying certiorari).
63. 560 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1990).
64. Id. at 337, 345. At least two other state supreme courts rejected market share
liability for the same reasons. See, e.g., Mulcahey v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67,
75 (Iowa 1986); Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 246 (Mo. 1984).
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claimed that she developed cancer as a result of her mother's use of
DES during her pregnancy twenty-five years earlier.65 Her complaint
alleged various theories of liability, some of which invoked a market
share theory.' The court concluded that Illinois would not adopt any
market share theory, and asserted several reasons to support its hold-
ing.6 ' First, the court determined that market share liability is often
unworkable because, in many instances, little or no information exists
to help the court determine relevant market shares.68 Second, the court
was troubled by the significant likelihood that the actual manufacturer
*of DES consumed by the plaintiff's mother was not named as a defen-
dant in the suit.69 Third, the court was concerned that market share
theories would make manufacturers insurers of their entire industry by
effectively reducing drug availability, slowing research and develop-
ment of new drugs, and increasing retail drug prices.7 ° Finally, the
65. Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 325. The plaintiff was diagnosed with clear cell adenocar-
cinoma of the vagina in 1978. Id. at 326. The plaintiff's mother had taken DES tablets
daily during the time she was pregnant with the plaintiff. Id. Although the plaintiff
knew the color, size, and dosage of the drug her mother took, she was unable to identify
the specific manufacturer of the product. Id. Records recovered from the pharmacy where
her mother filled her prescriptions were insufficient to match the drug manufacturer to
the drug dispensed to the plaintiff's mother. Id.
66. Id. at 326. Plaintiff's second amended complaint consisted of II counts sounding
in negligence, strict liability, breach of express warranty, fraud, breach of implied
warranty, violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, conspiracy, concert of
action, joint and several liability, and joint enterprise liability. Id. The thrust of these
causes of action was that the drug companies failed to properly test DES and to ade-
quately warn of its dangers. Id.
67. Id. at 337-40. Specifically, the court held: "We conclude that market share liabil-
ity is not a sound theory, is too great a deviation from our existing tort principles and
should not be applied in cases brought by plaintiffs who were exposed to DES while in
utero." Id. at 337.
68. Id. The Smith court had the benefit of the experiences of California trial courts,
which had expressed "exasperation" with the task of attempting to formulate market
shares. Id. The Smith court thus concluded that acceptance of market share liability
would create a tremendous cost, both monetarily and in terms of workload, on the court
system and litigants alike. Id. at 338. Further, if courts and juries were allowed to
apportion damages when reliable information was not available, the result would be
arbitrary determinations and wide variances between judgments. Id.
69. Id. at 338. The defendants presented evidence that 63 of the potential 81 manu-
facturers were never before the court. Id. at 338. Other defendants either were not served,
had gone out of business, had merged with other companies, or were not amenable to suit
in Illinois. Id. The court concluded: "To impose liability when it is quite possible that
the defendant is not before the court is too speculative." Id. Accord Payton v. Abbott
Labs., 437 N.E.2d 171, 188 (Mass. 1982) (rejecting market share liability because of
the risk that the actual wrongdoer was not among the named defendants).
70. Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 341. The court noted that market share liability would
broaden manufacturers' exposure to liability because they would need to insure against
losses arising from products other than their own. Id. This added potential for liability
would likely contribute to increased prices and decreased availability of new drugs. Id. at
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court noted that market share theories actually treat plaintiffs who are
unable to identify the particular manufacturer better than those who
can.
7 1
In addition to offering specific reasons for declining to apply market
share liability, the Smith court generally noted that the market share
theory deviated too far from traditional tort principles.72 The court
observed that under traditional negligence and strict liability theories,
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant caused the plaintiff's in-
jury.73 The Smith court reasoned that under the market share theory,
some defendants wholly innocent of wrongdoing toward a particular
plaintiff would inevitably shoulder part or all of the responsibility for
the injury.74 Thus, the court concluded that the market share theory
was unsound.75 Although the Smith court did not specifically hold
342.
7 1. Id. at 338-39. The court noted that in a typical tort case, the plaintiff bears the
risk that the defendant will be unable to assume financial responsibilities for the injuries
caused. Id. at 339. With the market share theory, however, liability is spread across
members of the industry, reducing the risk that the plaintiff will be left without a solvent
defendant. Id. The theory therefore punishes plaintiffs who can satisfy the identifica-
tion element and creates an incentive for plaintiffs not to locate the particular defendant.
Id.
Because the court decided not to adopt market share liability, it did not reach the con-
stitutional arguments raised by the defendants. See Joint Appellants' Brief at 39-44,
Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324 (II1. 1990) (No. 67732) (arguing that the mar-
ket share theory creates an irrational, unreasonable, and effectively irrebuttable pre-
sumption of defendant identification in violation of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution).
72. Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 343-44.
73. Id. at 344; but cf Wysocki v. Reed, 583 N.E.2d 1139, 1145 (III. App. 1st Dist.
1991) (holding that a deviation from the rule of causation in fact was appropriate where
plaintiff could not identify which of two manufacturers had made the drugs taken by her
deceased husband, because it is more "unjust that an injured party receive nothing from
two admitted wrongdoers because he can't identify which one injured him than it is that
both of two admitted wrongdoers should be held jointly and severally liable unless one
can show by a preponderance of the evidence that the other caused the injury"), appeal
denied, 591 N.E.2d 994 (Ill. 1992).
74. Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 340. The court noted that market share liability places the
burden on defendants to disprove causation, regardless of whether the defendants have
the ability to determine which party among them is actually responsible for manufactur-
ing the injury-causing product. Id. By contrast, in earlier exceptions to the causation
rule, such as the alternative liability theory and res ipsa loquitor, the parties all bore
some culpability for causing the plaintiffs injury or were very closely connected to the
injury-causing activity or instrumentality. Id.
75. Id. at 344. The court held that "this is too great a deviation from a tort principle
which we have found to serve a vital function in the law, causation in fact." Id. at 345.
The causation requirement assigns blame-worthiness to culpable parties and limits the
scope of liability, thus encouraging useful activities that could be deterred by the threat
of exposure to excessive liability. Id. at 329.
Justice Clark, however, argued that the court had a duty to modify the common law to
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that market share liability violated the "public policy" of the state, it
nevertheless squarely rejected the theory as unworkable and undesir-
able .76
D. Recovery Against Drug Dealers in Other States
Against the backdrop of available common law theories, at least five
states have adopted legislation imposing civil market share liability on
drug dealers." These statutes allow victims of torts committed by
drug users to recover from any drug dealer, as long as the dealer par-
ticipated in the drug market when and where the user obtained the
drugs leading to the injury.78 In addition to establishing a method by
which plaintiffs could be compensated for injuries caused by drug
users, these laws attempt to reduce drug-related crime.79
Currently, Illinois, Arkansas, Hawaii, Michigan, and Oklahoma
have enacted nearly identical drug dealer liability acts.80 All of the
remedy an injustice resulting from societal changes. Id. at 345 (Clark, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Cause in fact, Justice Clark argued, "is not an end of the
legal system, but rather the means by which the legal system achieves its purposes." Id.
at 346 (Clark, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Shackil v. Lederle
Labs., 561 A.2d 511 (N.J. 1989) (O'Hern, J., dissenting)). Justice Clark argued that
when the means become inadequate to serve society's changing needs, such means can
and should be modified. Id. (Clark, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76. See Millar-Mintz v. Abbott Labs., 645 N.E.2d 278, 283 (III. App. 1st Dist.
1994). The court in Millar-Mintz rejected the plaintiffs assertion that Illinois law did
not preclude her from pursuing a claim under a market share liability theory, because the
Smith court did not expressly state that the market share theory was against the public
policy of the state. Id. at 282. The court concluded that "[wihile the [Smith] court did
not utter the 'magic language' that the market share liability theory was against 'public
policy,' it is clear that the supreme court has found the concept unworkable under the law
of the State of Illinois." Id. at 283.
77. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
78. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 691.1601(2)(b) (West Supp. 1995) (stating
that one of the purposes of the Act is to "[a]ssess the cost of illegal marketing of con-
trolled substances against persons who profit from that market").
80. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-124-101 (Michie Supp. 1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 4-
36-663D (1995); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 57/1-85 (West Supp. 1996); MICH.
CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 691.1601 (West Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2-421
(West 1994).
Daniel Bent, a former United States Attorney from Hawaii, authored the model legisla-
tion for the Drug Dealer Liability Act, which has been enacted in Illinois and four other
states. Illinois Permits Suits Against Drug Dealers, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 28, 1995, at A8.
Bent stated that the time he spent as a United States Attorney convinced him that the
criminal justice system, by itself, "was not going to solve [the nation's] drug problem."
Id. Thus, Bent devised the Drug Dealer Liability Act, after studying negligence law and
market share liability theories. Id. The American Legislative Exchange Council made
the Drug Dealer Liability Act one of its model laws in 1992. Id.
Drug dealer liability acts have been introduced in Louisiana, New Jersey, New York,
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statutes create civil liability for illegal drug-dealing based on a market
share theory.8 ' Under these laws, persons injured as a result of the
illegal drug market may sue any person who participated in that mar-
ket, provided that three requirements are met: that the defendant sold
drugs at the same time, in the same area, and involving the same type
of drug as that used by the person who caused the plaintiffs injury. 2
These drug dealer liability laws differ from traditional market share
theories because they do not provide for apportionment of the plain-
tiff's damages.8 3 While each of these acts contain some minor differ-
ences, their effect is nearly identical.8 4 Ficano v. Clemens 5 was the
first suit brought under a drug dealer liability act. The plaintiffs in
Ficano received a $9 million default judgment against two convicted
drug dealers.8 6 Ficano involved two co-plaintiffs: a baby born ad-
and Pennsylvania. See S. 743, Reg. Sess. (La. 1995); S. 897, 42d Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J.
1995); S. 4644, 218th Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (N.Y. 1995); H.R. 1620, 179th Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Penn. 1995).
81. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-124-104 (Michie Supp. 1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 4-
36-663D-3 (1995); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 57/25(b) (West Supp. 1996):
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1608 (West Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2-
424(B) (West Supp. 1996).
82. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-124-104 (Michie Supp. 1995); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 4-36-663D-3 (1995); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 57/25(b) (West Supp. 1996);
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1608 (West Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 2-
424(B) (West 1994). These acts contain only very minor differences. For example, the
acts have different means of defining the geographic area for which the defendant is
liable. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-124-109(1) (Michie Supp. 1995) (defined according to
county); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663D-6 (1995) (defined by "tax map section"); ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 57/15 (West Supp. 1996) (defined by representative district);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1609 (West Supp. 1995) (defined by county); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2-421 (West Supp. 1996) (defined by county). See infra part 111.B
for an in-depth discussion of the Illinois Act.
83. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-124-101 (Michie Supp. 1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 4-
36-663D (1995); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 57/1 (West Supp. 1996); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1601 (West Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2-421
(West Supp. 1996).
84. For example, the Michigan, Oklahoma, and Arkansas acts specifically provide
that a prosecuting attorney or attorney general may represent the state or a political sub-
division of the state suing a drug dealer. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-124-112(a) (Michie
Supp. 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1613 (West Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 2-434 (West Supp. 1996). Additional differences include the Hawaii
requirement that drug user plaintiffs turn over 25% of the damages they recover to the
state for deposit in a general fund. HAW. REV. STAT. § 4-36-663D-3 (1995).
85. No. 95-512918 (Cir. Ct. Wayne County Mich. 1995).
86. Traci Gentilozzi, First Judgment Under Michigan's Drug Dealer Liability Act Is
Over $8 Million, MICH. LAW. WKLY., Aug. 7, 1995, at 6. The case was filed against four
convicted drug dealers, two of whom are serving prison sentences. Id. The court entered
judgment against the two dealers who were not in prison after they failed to appear. Id.
Neither defendant has challenged the judgment. Mediation Summary of Plaintiff Alan A.
May at 3, Ficano v. Clemens, No. 95-512918 (Cir. Ct. Wayne County Mich. 1995).
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dicted to cocaine who was allegedly killed by her drug-addicted
mother;8 7 and the local sheriffs department, which spent money on
behalf of prison inmates addicted to drugs.88 The co-plaintiffs in
Ficano did not offer proof that any of the defendants actually sold the
injury-causing drugs, or that the defendants even knew each other.8 9
Rather, the plaintiffs showed that the defendants had been convicted of
selling drugs in the Detroit area. 90 The jury awarded a $1 million
default judgment to the child's estate, based on damages for her
wrongful death and the pain and suffering caused by her cocaine
addiction while she was alive. 9' In addition, the jury awarded the
sheriff s department an $8 million default judgment. 2
E. Constitutional Issues Raised by Drug Dealer Liability Acts
Despite the commendable goals underlying the drug dealer liability
acts, these statutes implicate several constitutional provisions, includ-
ing the Due Process Clause93 and the Double Jeopardy Clause.94
The remaining two defendants--one of whom is serving a life sentence-were in prison
awaiting trial. Id. Neither defendant was represented by counsel. Mediation Summary of
Plaintiff Robert A. Ficano at I, Ficano v. Clemens, No. 95-512918 (Cir. Ct. Wayne
County Mich. 1995).
87. Mediation Summary of Plaintiff Robert A. Ficano at 3. The baby, Felicia Brown,
was born addicted to cocaine, suffered intrauterine growth retardation, and remained
underdeveloped for the duration of her life. Id. She was beaten to death at age twenty
months. Id. at 5. At the time of the trial, Felicia's mother, a recovering drug addict, was
in jail awaiting trial for the killing. Mediation Summary of Plaintiff Alan A. May at 3.
88. Mediation Summary of Plaintiff Robert A. Ficano at 8. The sheriffs office
incurred costs for substance abuse programs and increased medical expenses. Id. It was
estimated by the sheriff's office that these programs cost Michigan taxpayers roughly
$60 million per year. Id.
89. Drug Dealer Liability Law to be Tested in Detroit Case, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, May
4, 1995, at C3. The lawsuit contended that the dealers were "financially responsible for
the toddler's death even though there was no proof that they were connected to her in any
way." Id.
90. Stephen Jones, Suit Targets 4 Drug Convicts For Damages in Tot's Death, DET.
FREE PRESS, May 3, 1995, at lB. Wayne County Sheriff Robert Ficano stated, "Earline
Brown's actions are an example of what inevitably happens when drug demand meets
drug supply." Id.; see also Corey Williams, Ficano Seeks Assets of Drug Dealers in
Beating Death of Child, DET. NEWS, May 9, 1995, at B4 (stating that drug dealers are
liable not because they sold drugs to a particular plaintiff, but because they sold drugs in
a particular area of Detroit).
9 1. Jones, supra note 90, at lB.
92. Gary Heinlein, Drug Sellers Deal Blow to Seizures, DET. NEWS, Sept. 18, 1995, at
3. Although the sheriffs office recovered money spent on drug-addicted inmates, Wayne
County Sheriff Robert Ficano has called the Drug Dealer Liability Act a "useful tool" that
law enforcement officials can employ to support their drug law enforcement activities.
Id.
93. See infra part II.E.l.
94. See infra part II.E.2.
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While the constitutionality of drug dealer liability laws has not yet been
challenged in the courts, future challenges may result in the invalida-
tion of these laws based on their unconstitutionality.
1. Due Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law."95 The clause requires state governments to create
a fair adjudicatory process before impairing a person's "life, liberty, or
property. 96 Thus, in civil cases, the government must provide a
"neutral decisionmaker," and must ensure that the trial is fair.9
The Due Process Clause also prevents state legislatures from enact-
ing laws that are procedurally unfair.98 In the evidentiary context, the
clause limits the legislature's ability to create statutory presumptions,
where the proof of one fact constitutes evidence of the existence of an
ultimate fact sought to be proven at trial. 99 When deciding whether a
particular statutory presumption violates the Due Process Clause,
courts apply a rational relation test."° The presumption will be upheld
if there is a "rational relation between the fact proved and the ultimate
fact presumed."'' The presumption will not violate the Due Process
Clause unless it is irrational or arbitrary. 1' 2
Market share theories have invoked criticisms based upon the Due
Process Clause because of the presumptions these theories create.'
0 3
95. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Similarly, the Illinois Constitution provides: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." ILL.
CONST. of 1970 art. 1, § 2. The Illinois Supreme Court applies decisions of the United
States Supreme Court based on federal constitutional provisions to the construction of
comparable provisions in the State Constitution. People v. Levin, 623 N.E.2d 317 (II.
1993). Thus, while this Comment focuses on the Federal Constitution, the Illinois
courts would probably apply a similar analysis if such a challenge were made under the
Illinois Constitution. But see People v. McCauley, 645 N.E.2d 923, 930 (II1. 1994)
(interpreting a state constitutional provision differently than the United States Supreme
Court interpreted a comparable federal constitutional provision).
96. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § i; ROTUNDA & NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 17.1, at 201 (2d ed. 1992).
97. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 96, § 17.1, at 201.
98. Id. § 17.6, at 245.
99. Id.
100. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 301.6 (3d ed. 1991)
(citing Usery v. Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 28 (1976); Mobile, J. & K.C.R. Co.
v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910)). See also Dale A. Nance, Civility and the Burden
of Proof, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 647, 672-73 n.81 (1994) (stating that the rational
relation test requires minimal scrutiny).
101. GRAHAM, supra note 100, § 301.6.
102. See id.
103. Although defendants, courts, and commentators have raised criticisms of market
1996] 1037
1038 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 27
In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,"°4 for example, the defendants
argued that the market share theory created a presumption of liability in
violation of their due process rights. 5 Under the court's market share
theory, once the plaintiff proved that a defendant manufactured DES,
the product that injured the plaintiff, the court presumed that the defen-
dant caused the plaintiff's injury and shifted the burden to the defen-
dant to prove that it did not cause the injury." 6 Because any one of the
200 companies that manufactured DES could have caused this injury,
the defendants argued that no rational relationship existed between the
proved fact-that they manufactured DES-and the presumed fact-
that they caused plaintiffs injury. 1 7 Thus, the defendants concluded
that the market share theory deprived them of their due process
rights. '08
The Sindell court, however, did not find a due process violation.
The Sindell court conceded that the defendants' due process rights
might be violated if the five named defendants were declared to be the
only tortfeasors, since a "substantial likelihood" existed that none of
the defendants caused the injury. 9 The court, however, relied on a
different measure of the likelihood of causation: the percentage of
sales of DES in the national DES market that resulted from the defen-
share liability's constitutionality, the United States Supreme Court has not decided the
issue of whether market share liability is constitutional. The Court has consistently
denied certiorari in market share liability cases. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607
P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539
N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989); Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 342
N.W.2d 37 (Wis.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
104. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). See supra notes 48-57
and accompanying text.
105. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 931 n.17. According to the Restatement of Torts, the
burden of proof shifts to the defendants under the Summers doctrine only if the plaintiff
can demonstrate that all defendants acted tortiously and that the harm resulted from the
conduct of one of them. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B, at 446 (1984). Before
Sindell, the rule was applied only where all actors involved were joined as defendants and
where the conduct of all was simultaneous. Id.
106. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937.
107. Id. at 931.
108. Id. at 931 n.17.
109. Id. The majority noted:
As we have seen, an undiluted Summers rationale is inappropriate to shift the
burden of proof of causation to defendants because if we measure the chance
that any particular manufacturer supplied the injury-causing product by the
number of producers of DES, there is a possibility that none of the five
defendants in this case produced the offending substance and that the
responsible manufacturer, not named in the action, will escape liability.
Id. at 936-37.
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dants' manufacturing." s Thus, "each manufacturer's liability for an
injury would be approximately equivalent to the damages caused by
the DES it manufactured.""'
2. Double Jeopardy
The United States Supreme Court has long held that the Double
Jeopardy Clause protects against three distinct abuses: a second pros-
ecution for a crime after being acquitted of that crime; a second prose-
cution for an offense after being convicted of that offense; and multiple
punishments for the same offense.' 2 The protection against multiple
punishment is deeply rooted in American history and jurisprudence." 13
More than a century ago, for example, the Supreme Court stated that
"[i]f there is anything settled in the jurisprudence of England and
America, it is that no man can be twice lawfully punished for the same
offence.""' More recently, the Supreme Court rejected the view that
the Double Jeopardy Clause applies only to punishment imposed in
criminal proceedings. Rather, a "civil" sanction imposed and collected
by the government may constitute punishment as well." 5
Courts must look to the purposes actually served by the sanction,
rather than the nature of the proceedings where the sanction is im-
posed, to determine whether a sanction constitutes punishment under
the Double Jeopardy Clause."16 A civil penalty is considered remedial,
and does not constitute punishment, if it merely reimburses the gov-
ernment for its actual costs incurred because of the defendant's crimi-
110. Id. at 937. If the plaintiff could establish at trial that the defendants produced
90% of the DES marketed, there would be a corresponding likelihood that the defendants
manufactured the DES which caused the plaintiff's injuries, and only a 10% likelihood
that the offending producer would escape liability. Id.
11l. Id. at 938.
112. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989).
113. Id. "In drafting his initial version of what came to be our Double Jeopardy
Clause, James Madison focused explicitly on the issue of multiple punishment: 'No per-
son shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than one punishment or
one trial for the same offence."' Id. (quoting I ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (J. Gales ed.
1834)).
114. Er Parte Lange, 68 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168 (1874).
115. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447. See, e.g., Department of Rev. v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S.
Ct. 1937, 1948 (1994) (holding that a tax imposed under Montana's Dangerous Drug
Tax Act was punishment for double jeopardy purposes); People v. Towns, 646 N.E.2d
1366, 1371 (Il. App. 2d Dist. 1995) (stating that civil forfeiture under the Illinois Con-
trolled Substances Act and Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act constituted punishment
for double jeopardy purposes), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. In re P.S., 661 N.E.2d
329 (I11. 1996).
116. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447 n.7.
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nal conduct."7 On the other hand, a civil sanction constitutes punish-
ment if it is retributive, punitive, or deterrent in nature." 8 States must
impose such sanctions during the first proceeding, or not at all."19
Cases addressing the multiple punishments prohibition in the civil
context involved government-imposed and collected sanctions. 20
Examples of civil sanctions that courts have struck down as punish-
ment in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause include penalties,' 2'
taxes, 22 and civil forfeiture. 23
Ill. DISCUSSION
The Illinois legislature envisioned the Drug Dealer Liability Act not
only as a means of compensating victims of the drug market, but also
as a means of assisting law enforcement efforts in curbing drug-related
crime.1 24 This Part first provides an overview of the Illinois General
117. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1945. The central inquiry is whether the sanction
imposed is rationally related to the damages suffered by the government. Id. at 1944.
118. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448; Towns, 646 N.E.2d at 1368.
119. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1948. Some federal circuits hold that civil forfeiture
actions do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because they are part of a single coor-
dinated prosecution of the defendant, thus avoiding the "punishment" principles of
Kurth Ranch and Halper altogether. See, e.g., United States v. One Single Family Resi-
dence, 13 F.3d 1493, 1499 (1 1th Cir. 1994) (holding that the simultaneous pursuit of
criminal and civil forfeiture sanctions under a gambling statute was merely a "single co-
ordinated prosecution" of the defendants and, thus, did not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause); United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that civil forfei-
ture action was part of a single coordinated prosecution of the defendant that did not
violate double jeopardy principles), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 992 (1994).
120. See, e.g., Halper, 490 U.S. at 447 (penalty imposed by government for viola-
tions of the federal civil False Claims Act constituted punishment for double jeopardy
purposes); Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1948 (tax imposed by the government for viola-
tion of Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax Act constituted punishment for double jeopardy
purposes); United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.
1994) (civil forfeiture action brought by the government constituted second punishment
for double jeopardy purposes), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct.
762 (1996).
121. Halper, 490 U.S. at 446.
122. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1948.
123. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1216. In U.S. Currency, the govern-
ment brought a criminal prosecution and a separate civil forfeiture action against several
defendants. Id. at 1214. The court stayed the forfeiture action pending the outcome of
the criminal prosecution. Id. After the defendants were convicted, the district court
granted summary judgment for the government in the forfeiture case. Id. The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that civil forfeiture under the federal statutes constituted punishment in viola-
tion of the Double Jeopardy Clause because the statute at issue served some retributive
and deterrent functions. Id. at 1219.
124. See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 57/10 (West Supp. 1996); HOUSE
JUDICIARY COMMrITEE REPORT, supra note 11 (stating that the law is just "one more
weapon in the war against drugs").
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Assembly's findings supporting the statute.' 25 This Part then exam-
ines the type of recovery provided for under the Act and the elements
that a potential plaintiff must prove in order to recover.' 26
A. Legislative Findings Supporting the Drug Dealer
Liability Act in Illinois
The legislative findings of the Drug Dealer Liability Act ("the Act")
focus on two issues: helping victims of the illegal drug market recover
against drug dealers; and undermining the State's illegal drug mar-
ket.' 27 First, the Illinois General Assembly stated that it adopted the
Drug Dealer Liability Act in response to a third party victim's inability
to recover damages from a drug dealer under traditional common law
doctrines. 128 The legislature noted that the drug trade exerts a
"financial, physical, and emotional toll" on the residents of Illinois.'
29
Moreover, because of the common law difficulties in proving a drug
user's particular dealer, victims of the drug trade face several barriers
to recovery for their losses from drug dealers.' 30  The legislature
determined that allowing plaintiffs to sue drug dealers under a form of
market liability would eliminate this difficulty. 3'
Second, the legislature indicated that the Act could serve as a
"weapon" against the illegal drug market.' 32 The legislature deter-
mined that market liability destroyed market initiative and product
125. See infra notes 127-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Act's leg-
islative findings.
126. See infra notes 143-69 and accompanying text for an overview of recovery
under the Act.
127. See infra notes 128-39 and accompanying text.
128. The stated purpose of the Act is "to provide a civil remedy for damages to per-
sons in a community injured as a result of illegal drug use." ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch.
740, § 57/5 (West Supp. 1996). The legislature noted:
In theory, civil action for damages for distribution of illegal drugs can be
brought under existing law. They are not. Several barriers account for this.
Under existing tort law, only those dealers in the actual chain of distribution
to a particular user are sued. Drug babies, parents of adolescent illegal drug
users, and insurers are not likely to be able to identify the chain of distribution
to a particular user .... Unlike the chain of distribution for legal products, in
which records identifying the parties to each transaction in the chain are made
and shared among the parties, the distribution of illegal drugs is clandestine.
Its participants expend considerable effort to keep the chain of distribution
secret.
Id. § 57/10(7).
129. Id. § 57/10(1).
130. Id. § 57/10(7).
131. Id.
132. Id. § 57/10(2). The legislature found: "Although the criminal justice system is
an important weapon against the illegal drug market, the civil justice system can and
must also be used." Id.
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development when applied to legitimate markets.'33 In addition, the
legislature determined that drug dealers in a community are necessarily
interrelated and interdependent, even if they do not always know one
another. 3 4 It found that drug dealers are at least indirectly related, in
that each new dealer obtains the benefit of the existing illegal drug
market to make illegal drugs available to him or her.3 5 Thus, the leg-
islature intended market share liability under the Act to negatively im-
pact all dealers in the illegal drug market. 36
The legislature clearly intended for the Act to deter drug dealers. 37
In the Act's preamble, the legislature acknowledged that the criminal
justice system is an important and effective weapon against the illegal
drug market, but concluded that the law should also require those per-
sons who participate in the illegal drug market to bear the financial
costs of harm caused by their activities. 3  The legislature concluded
that the threat of liability under the Act would deter some prospective
133. Id. § 57/10(9). Moreover, the legislature recognized that market liability pro-
vides for civil recovery by plaintiffs who are unable to identify the particular manufac-
turer of the product, allowing recovery from all manufacturers of the product who partici-
pated in that particular market. Id.
134. Id. § 57/10(8).
135. Id. Additionally, the existing illegal drug market aids new entrants through its
prior development of people as users. Id.
136. See id. § 57/10(8)-(9).
137. Id. § 57/5. The purpose of the Act "is to establish the prospect of substantial
monetary loss as a deterrent to those who have not yet entered into the illegal drug dis-
tribution market." Id. (emphasis added).
138. Id. § 57/10. Representative Salvi, one of the Act's sponsors, stated: "We're
simply trying to get at the drug dealer for the damage he causes." HOUSE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 11. Similarly, the Act's Senate sponsor, Senator
Peterson, stated: "The purpose of the bill is to create a system of monetary compensa-
tion for persons injured by [the] illegal drug market and create an incentive for users to
identify the drug dealer." ILLINOIS SENATE TRANSCRIPT, 89TH GEN. ASSEMBLY, REGULAR
SESS., May 18, 1995, at 37 [hereinafter SENATE TRANSCRIPT].
During floor debate of the Act, Representative Salvi stated, "Although the criminal
justice system is an important weapon against the illegal drug market, the civil justice
system can and must also be used." ILLINOIS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TRANSCRIPT,
89TH GEN. ASSEMBLY, REGULAR SESS., Mar. 22, 1995, at 20 [hereinafter HOUSE
TRANSCRIPT]. During a House floor debate, Representative Salvi touted the Act as a
measure which may "very well help us shut down the illegal drug market in the State of
Illinois." Id. at 1. The legislature also concluded that allowing dealers who face a civil
judgment for drug dealing under the Act to bring a suit for contribution against their own
sources may "drive a wedge into the relationships among some participants in the
illegal drug distribution network." ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 57/10 (West Supp.
1996). Representative Salvi called the Act the equivalent of "a cop on every block ....
We will have individual Attorney Generals [sic] making sure that drug dealers do not
profit from their illegal activity." HOUSE TRANSCRIPT, supra, at 20. Representative
Salvi stated: "This will eliminate the economic incentive for selling drugs in the State
of Illinois." Id.
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drug dealers, even if only a few suits were actually brought.'39 The
Illinois General Assembly did not discuss in detail whether the Act
would survive a constitutional challenge. 1'o Nonetheless, a sponsor of
the bill expressed confidence that no one would attack the law's consti-
tutionality, stating, "[T]his is a very well crafted Bill... put together
by some of the best minds in the country.' 14' The Act passed unani-
mously in both the House and Senate.1
42
B. Recovery Against Drug Dealers Under the Illinois
Drug Dealer Liability Act
The Act creates a cause of action for several classes of plaintiffs
who may have suffered personal or pecuniary injury because of a drug
user.143 Plaintiffs entitled to bring an action under the Act can recover
economic damages, non-economic damages, exemplary damages, rea-
l 39. The Act is specifically targeted at deterring first-time or casual dealers with non-
drug related assets, who might well decide that, as a result of the Act, the added cost of
entering the drug market would not be worth the benefit. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch 740,
§ 57/10(4) (West Supp. 1996).
140. The extent of the legislature's debate over the constitutionality of the law
consisted of this colloquy, which took place on the House floor:
REPRESENTATIVE FLOWERS: Representative Salvi is this constitutional?...
REPRESENTATIVE SALVI: Absolutely. I don't think anybody will even raise a
constitutional question about this bill.
HOUSE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 138, at 18.
Others have, however, raised the issue of the law's constitutionality. See David
Heckelman, Civil Drug-Assets Law Will Trample Rights: Critic, CHI. DAILY L. BULL.,
Aug. 15, 1995, at 1. Jed Stone, president of Illinois Attorneys for Criminal Justice,
stated that the statute's abrogation of defendants' due process rights "jumps off the page
and slaps me in the face." Id.
In discussing a similar law in place in Michigan, Larry Dubin, a law professor at the
University of Detroit-Mercy, suggested that courts may be leery of holding drug dealers
liable for a specific injury without some direct connection between their act and the
injury. Stephen Jones, Suit Targets Four Drug Convicts For Damages In Tot's Death,
DET. FREE PRESS, May 3, 1995, at lB. Dubin stated: "It is fine on the one hand to say
that drug dealers should be punished for their illegal acts, but that function is served by
our criminal justice system." Id.
141. HOUSE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 138, at 14.
142. In the Illinois Senate, the bill received 57 "yes" votes, zero "no" votes, and one
"present" vote. SENATE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 138, at 37. In the Illinois House, the
bill received 112 "yes" votes, zero "no" votes, and one "present" vote. HOUSE
TRANSCRIPT, supra note 138, at 20.
143. Those entitled to recover under the Act include a parent, legal guardian, child,
spouse, or sibling of a drug user; an individual who was exposed to an illegal drug in
utero; an employer of a drug user; a medical facility, insurer, governmental entity,
employer, or other entity that funds a drug treatment program or employee assistance
program for a drug user or that otherwise expended money on behalf of a drug user; and a
person injured as a result of the willful, reckless, or negligent actions of a drug user. ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 57/25(a)(l)-(5) (West Supp. 1996).
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sonable attorneys' fees, and other costs.' 44 Under the Act, plaintiffs
may proceed under a traditional theory of recovery, or under the leg-
islatively devised market share theory. 4 5 Under the traditional theory,
the plaintiff may seek damages from a specific drug dealer if the plain-
tiff can prove that the dealer sold the drugs that resulted in the plain-
tiffs injury. 146 Alternatively, plaintiffs who cannot identify the drug
dealer in the actual chain of distribution may proceed under the Act's
market share theory by meeting three requirements.
4 7
In order to state a valid cause of action under the market share
theory, plaintiffs must first show that their injuries occurred in the
same area in which the dealer sold drugs, known as the "illegal drug
market target community."' 48 The Act defines "illegal drug market tar-
get community,"'' 49 which grows in proportion to the amount of drugs
the defendant possessed or distributed. 50 The size of this community
ranges from "Level 1," which includes only the Illinois Representative
District in which the dealer operated, to "Level 4," which includes the
entire State of Illinois. 151
144. Id. § 57/25(c)(l)-(5). Economic damages include the cost of treatment and reha-
bilitation, loss of productivity, absenteeism, support expenses, accidents or injury, and
any other pecuniary loss proximately caused by the illegal drug use. Id. § 57/25(c)(1).
Non-economic damages include damages for physical and emotional pain, physical
impairment, mental anguish, disfigurement, and loss of companionship, services, or
consortium. Id. § 57/25(c)(2).
To ensure the collectibility of any potential damage award, a plaintiff may seek an ex
parte prejudgment attachment order against all assets of a defendant sufficient to satisfy
a potential award. Id. § 57/65(a)). Courts may not use assets seized in a forfeiture action
by any state or federal agency to satisfy a judgment, however. Id. § 57/65(c). Further-
more, although the Act does not provide for apportionment of the plaintiff's damages
according to the defendant's market share, it does create a right of contribution among
multiple defendants. Id. § 57/55.
145. Id. § 57/25.
146. Id. § 57/25(b)(1).
147. Id. § 57/25(b)(2). See infra notes 148-59 and accompanying text.
148. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 57/25(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1996).
149. Id. § 57/40. For example, under a "Level I" offense, the "illegal drug market
target community" of the defendant is defined as the Illinois Representative District
where the defendant resides, attends school, or is employed. Id. § 57/40(1); see also id.
§ 57/15 (where "place of participation" is defined as "each Illinois Representative Dis-
trict in which the person participates in the illegal drug market or in which the person
resides, attends school, or is employed during the period of the person's participation in
the illegal drug market").
150. Id. §§ 57/15, 57/40.
151. A "Level 1" offense is defined as possession of .25-4 oz. of cocaine, heroin, or
methamphetamines; distribution of less than one ounce of cocaine, heroin, or metham-
phetamine; possession of 1-4 lbs. of marijuana; or distribution of less than 1 lb. of mar-
ijuana. Id. § 57/15. A "Level 4" offense is defined as possession of 16 oz. or more of
cocaine, heroin, or methamphetamine; distribution of 4 oz. or more of cocaine, heroin,
or methamphetamine; possession of 100 plants or more of marijuana; and distribution
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Second, plaintiffs must show that the defendants sold the "same
type of illegal drug" that caused their injury.5 2 The Act does not
describe this requirement in detail.5 3 The Act's "Definitions" section,
,however, distinguishes between the sale of cocaine, heroin, or
methamphetamines, and the sale of marijuana. 5 4 Thus, the Act sug-
gests that if the sale of cocaine caused the plaintiff's injury, he or she
could not recover from a dealer who sold marijuana.'55
Third, plaintiffs must show that the defendant sold these drugs at
the time the plaintiffs suffered these injuries. 56 A defendant with a
criminal conviction under state or federal law is estopped from denying
participation in the illegal drug market. 57 Furthermore, such a con-
viction constitutes prima facie evidence that the defendant sold drugs
for two years before the date of the act for which he or she was con-
victed. 58 If the defendant does not have a conviction, plaintiffs must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant participated
in the illegal drug market at the time of their injury.'59
While the Act establishes a conclusive presumption that a convicted
drug dealer participated in the illegal drug market,' 60 even where there
is a criminal conviction, the plaintiff must still prove the timing, geo-
graphic, and type-of-drug elements of the claim.' 6' Once these ele-
ments are established, the defendant cannot exculpate himself by
attempting to show that he did not cause the plaintiff s injury. 62
of 10 lbs. or more of marijuana. Id. For example, a defendant found to have possessed
.25 oz. of cocaine would be liable to anyone injured by a drug user in the Illinois Repre-
sentative District where he lives, and if different, also the Illinois Representative Dis-
trict where he works. Id. §§ 57/15, 57/40(l). A defendant found to have distributed 4
oz. of cocaine would be potentially liable to every person in the state who is injured by a
drug user. Id. §§ 57/15, 57/40(4).
152. Id. § 57/25(b)(2)(B).
153. See id. §§ 57/15, 57/25(b)(2)(B).
154. For example, a "Level 2" offense means sale of 1-2 oz. of a "specified illegal
drug"-defined as cocaine, heroin, or methamphetamine-or sale of 5-10 lbs. of mari-
juana. Id. § 57/15. This section clearly distinguishes between the sale of cocaine,
heroin, and methamphetamine, and the sale of marijuana. Id.
155. However, the Act does not specifically state what is meant by "the same type of
illegal drug," and there is no case law interpreting the Act. See id. §§ 57/15,
57/25(b)(2)(B)).
156. Id. § 57/25(b)(2)(C).
157. Id. § 57/60(b).
158. Id.
159. Id. § 57/60(a). The plaintiff must prove all other elements of the cause of action
by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
160. Id. § 57/60(b).
161. Id. § 57/25(b)(2)(A)-(C).
162. Presumably, the defendant cannot avoid liability by disproving causation,
because causation is not one of the elements of the plaintiff's claim. See id.
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The liability established by the Act is distinct from existing market
liability theories because the Act does not require courts to apportion
damages in accordance with the defendant's market share. 163 Rather,
the Act suggests that a defendant is liable for all of the plaintiff's dam-
ages, provided that the plaintiff meets the other requirements of the
Act.1
64
In addition to third parties, drug users have a limited right of recov-
ery under the Act. 65 Drug users may sue only those defendants in the
actual chain of distribution, and may recover only economic damages
and reasonable attorneys' fees.' 66 In addition, the former user may be
partially responsible for his or her own injuries. 67 This comparative
responsibility will not bar recovery by the plaintiff, but will reduce the
plaintiff's damage award by the amount of his or her own liability. 6 8
Comparative responsibility cannot, however, be attributed to a plaintiff
who is not a drug user.
69
163. Id. § 57/25(b). During a House debate, Representative Salvi stated that the Drug
Dealer Liability Act is "market share liability times ten." HOUSE TRANSCRIPT, supra note
138, at 5. The liability created under the Act is similar to market share liability, in that
it allows the plaintiff to sue even though he cannot identify the person who caused his
injury. Id. Representative Salvi stated: "It's very similar to that although it goes much
further than that because ... a major drug dealer in the State of Illinois who has lots of
assets will find that hundreds of people throughout the State of Illinois will be [suling
him .... This is civil liability times 1000 ... so if you are interest[ed] in getting into
the illegal drug market you [sic] better be very careful, because you're going to get sued
and if you have assets, you are going to have to pay." Id.
164. Any person entitled to sue under the Act, except drug-user plaintiffs, can recover
economic damages, non-economic damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorneys'
fees, and other costs of suit. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 57/25(c) (West Supp.
1996). The Act does not provide for apportionment of damages among multiple defen-
dants according to their share of the illegal drug market, although it does provide a right
of contribution among multiple defendants. Id. § 57/55.
165. Id. § 57/30. Before they can recover, however, drug users must disclose to law
enforcement officers all personal knowledge of their drug sources. Id. § 57/30(a)(1).
Drug users also must be drug-free for six months prior to filing suit and must remain
drug-free during the pendency of the action. Id. § 57/30(a)(2)-(3).
166. Id. § 57/30(c)(l)-(3).
167. Id. § 57/50(a).
168. Id. The defendant sustains the burden of proving the plaintiffs comparative
responsibility by clear and convincing evidence. Id. § 57/50(b)).
169. Id. § 57/50(c).
The Illinois Drug Dealer Liability Act
IV. ANALYSIS
The drug problem in this nation is reaching epidemic proportions.
70
States legitimately aspire to protect innocent victims who suffer as a
result of drug dealers' illegal actions. Nonetheless, constitutional
requirements cannot be adjusted to fit the gravity of the crime problem
the State wishes to combat.' 7' If such an "adjustment" were allowed,
our country's fundamental ideals would gradually deteriorate. '
While the Illinois General Assembly's goal is commendable, the
means it employed violate the Constitution. 7
3
A. The Act Is Unconstitutional
1. Due Process
The Illinois Drug Dealer Liability Act creates an irrational and irre-
buttable presumption of liability once the plaintiff establishes three
elements under the Act.' This presumption violates the Due Process
Clause, which limits the power of state legislatures to make proof of
one fact evidence of the existence of the ultimate fact sought to be
proved. 75 Statutory presumptions of fact violate the Due Process
Clause if there is no rational connection between the fact proved and
the ultimate fact presumed. 176 A statutory presumption is thus invalid
unless the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the
proved fact. 
177
170. According to a study by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the drug abuse
violation arrest total for 1994 was up 18% from the 1993 level, and up 61% from the
1985 level. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 216 (1994).
[hereinafter CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES]. In Cook County, drug prosecutions rose 87%
between 1988 and 1990, and the number of drug convictions and prison sentences
doubled during this period. Rita A. Fry, Drug Treatment Before Punishment, CHI. TRIB.,
Aug. 31, 1992, at 8.
171. City of Chicago v. Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d 34, 42-43 (I11. App. 1st Dist. 1995).
172. d. at43.
173. See infra part IV.A. The Act creates an irrebuttable presumption of defendants'
culpability in violation of their due process rights. See infra part IV.A.1. The law also
violates the constitutional proscription against multiple punishment when applied to
defendants with criminal convictions. See infra part IV.A.2. Additionally, the law's
lack of a causality requirement abrogates fundamental tort principles employed to ensure
a just result in civil cases. See infra part IV.B.
174. See supra notes 148-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
elements.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102.
177. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969). See supra text accompanying
notes 98-102.
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Under the Act, the court presumes that the defendant caused the
plaintiff's injury if the plaintiff proves three facts: (1) the defendant
sold drugs in the same "illegal drug market community" where the in-
jury occurred; (2) the defendant sold the same type of drugs that the
user used; and (3) the defendant sold drugs at the time the user caused
the plaintiff s injury.'78 However, the presumed fact-that the defen-
dant caused the plaintiff's injury-has no rational relationship to these
proven facts and fails to establish any reasonable probability that the
defendant's sale of drugs was involved in the plaintiffs injury.'79
There are thousands of drug convictions each year in Illinois. 8 0 It
would be difficult to establish that it is more likely than not that any
one of the convicted dealers who satisfy the Act's three broad require-
ments caused a particular plaintiff s injury.' 8' The Act thus authorizes
plaintiffs-as "private attorney generals"-to recover from drug
dealers for an injury that someone else caused. 182
Furthermore, the Act imposes liability on defendants for injuries that
occur in an arbitrarily defined geographic area. 83 For instance, in ap-
plying the Act, a court would presume that a defendant convicted of
selling half an ounce of marijuana sold those drugs within the Illinois
representative district where he or she lives. 8 4 Such a presumption
does not account for the fact that, while dealers may also sell drugs
only within one city block, dealers may sell drugs to users in other
areas of the city, other cities, and other states. 85 It is unlikely that
178. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 57/25(b)(2) (West Supp. 1996). See supra
notes 148-59 and accompanying text.
179. See infra notes 181-86 and accompanying text.
180. In 1991, the State of Illinois incarcerated 5192 persons for drug offenses. Fry,
supra note 170, at 8. In 1994, more than 14,000 people were arrested on drug charges in
Illinois. This number does not include arrests made in Chicago. ILLINOIS UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTING SYSTEM, ILLINOIS STATE POLICE, ARREST SUMMARY REPORT (1994). In 1994,
nationwide, roughly 1.3 million arrests were made by state and local police for drug
abuse violations. CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 170, at 217.
181. See Leary, 395 U.S. at 36. A statutory presumption is unconstitutional "unless
it can be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to
flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend." id.; see also supra text
accompanying notes 98-102.
182. HOUSE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 138, at 20 (referring to plaintiffs as "individual
Attorney Generals"). Additionally, the Act entitles a plaintiff to seek damages from a
person who participated in the illegal drug market, even if that person had nothing to do
with actually causing the plaintiffs injury. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 57/25(b)
(West Supp. 1996).
183. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 57/40 (West Supp. 1996). See supra notes
148-51 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
185. Many dealers sell to customers from other areas of the city or state. For
example, in a drug sting on the west side of Chicago in which 49 people were arrested,
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arbitrarily drawn political boundaries bear any relation to the area in
which the defendant has actually caused injuries. Therefore, the Act,
which permits the plaintiff to prevail without proving causation, is
based on the presumption that because a defendant sold drugs some-
where to someone, the defendant's conduct thereby caused injury to
the plaintiff. Such a theory rests on an illogical presumption, and fails
to satisfy the requirements of due process."8 6
Moreover, the presumption of liability created by the Act is effec-
tively irrebuttable. The Act establishes a conclusive presumption that a
defendant with a criminal conviction participated in the illegal drug
market.8 7 The plaintiff must prove only the geographic, timing, and
type-of-drug elements of the claim.18 8 A plaintiff can easily prove
these elements in cases where the prior conviction was for the same
type of drugs, in the same area, and at the same time as the plaintiff's
injury.
Once the three minimal elements are established, a defendant would
presumably be liable under the Act even if he could prove that some-
one else sold the drugs causing plaintiff's injury. The basis of liability
41 of those individuals were from outside the area, several from the suburbs, and one
from as far away as Wisconsin. John W. Fountain, 49 Alleged Buyers Arrested in Drug
Sting, CHI. TRIB., May 3, 1994, at 5. See also Monica Copeland, Neighborhood Under
Siege, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 29, 1991, at I (reporting that experts believe a south-side
Chicago neighborhood has become a "mecca for Chicagoans from other neighborhoods
and suburbanites seeking cheap, readily available narcotics"). Moreover, dealers have
begun using mail services to sell drugs in other states and cities. Joseph Kirby, Pushers
Discover Overnight Delivery, CHI. TRIB., Mar. I1, 1993, at 1. For example, authorities
recently charged an Arizona man with interstate drug trafficking after he unwittingly
sold 2 1/4 lbs. of cocaine to an Illinois law enforcement agent through the mail. Id. The
man reportedly had many customers scattered across Illinois and other parts of the
nation. Id.
186. The constitutionality of statutory presumptions will normally be analyzed under
a rational relation standard, which requires minimal scrutiny by a court. Nance, supra
note 100, at 673 n.81. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text. The Supreme
Court, however, has invalidated statutes when applying the rational relation standard in
certain cases. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)
(holding a city's denial of a permit for the operation of a group home for the mentally
retarded to be unconstitutional); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982)
(finding a requirement that an employment commission conduct a conference within 120
days of a filing of a complaint to be irrational and arbitrary, in that the commission's
failure to meet the 120-day requirement would deprive a complainant of the right to a
hearing); United States Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (striking down
as unconstitutional a provision limiting federal food stamps to households that contain
related persons). Thus, when a statute exhibits no rational relation between means and
ends, the statute is necessarily unconstitutional, even under a minimal scrutiny standard.
187. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 57/60(b) (West Supp. 1996). See supra notes
160-62 and accompanying text.
188. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 57/25(b)(2) (West Supp. 1996). See supra
notes 148-59 and accompanying text.
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under the Act is not a causal link between act and injury but the defen-
dant's participation in the drug market.'89 In such a case, the Act
would require the defendant to pay for an injury he clearly did not
cause.' 90 The Act therefore has the effect of taking property of the
defendant to pay for harm caused by someone else, over whom the
defendant has no control.' 9' This irrebuttable presumption of liability
violates defendants' due process rights. 92
Admittedly, all market share theories involve some presumption of
liability. 93 Nonetheless, the constitutionality of market share theories
remains an unresolved question of law. 194 Moreover, "traditional"
market share theories at least provide some measure of fairness to
defendants by holding them liable for only a portion of the plaintiff's
damages.' gs Traditional market share theories also require that the
plaintiff name as defendants all those manufacturers who, taken
together, had a substantial share of the market. 96 Courts have recog-
nized that such a large pool is necessary to make imposing evenly
apportioned damages fair.' 97 The Drug Dealer Liability Act fails to
1 89. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 57/20(a) (West Supp. 1996). The Act states:
"A person who knowingly participates in the illegal drug market within this State is
liable for civil damages as provided in this Act." Id.
190. If the plaintiff meets the minimal requirements of the Act, however, the defen-
dant appears to have no way of exculpating himself. See id. § 57/25(b). The Act pro-
vides for no affirmative defenses, but instead imposes liability if the three requirements
are met. See id. The Act thus imposes a form of liability that exceeds strict liability,
because a defendant can incur liability even where the plaintiff has not established causa-
tion, and even where the defendant proves that someone else actually caused the injury.
See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 33, § 103, at 712-13 (noting that the
plaintiff in a strict products liability action has the burden of proving that his or her
injury is attributable to a dangerous condition of a product identified as being one that
was supplied by the target defendant, either as a manufacturer or some other seller or
supplier in the marketing chain).
191. See Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 289 N.W.2d 20, 33 (Moore, J., dissenting) (Mich.
Ct. App.), affd, 343 N.W.2d 164 (Mich. 1979), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984).
192. "A statute creating a presumption that is arbitrary or that operates to deny a fair
opportunity to repel it violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Western & At. R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639, 642 (1929).
193. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
194. The United States Supreme Court declined certiorari in Sindell and subsequent
cases involving market share liability. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069
(N.Y.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
195. See, e.g., Sindell, 607 P.2d at 931. The Sindell court held that it could not
impose the whole liability for the plaintiffs injuries on the defendants, but that it was
reasonable to hold defendants liable for damages in proportion to their share of the DES
market. Id. at 937.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 931. The Sindell court conceded that defendants' due process rights might
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provide even these limited measures of fairness, as defendants sued
under the Act may be liable for 100% of the plaintiff's damages,
despite the likelihood that they did not cause the plaintiffs injury.' 98
Thus, the Act adopts the relaxed causation principles of market share
liability, while rejecting the principles courts have employed to protect
defendants' due process rights. Such a scheme is unconstitutional.' 99
2. Double Jeopardy
The Drug Dealer Liability Act also violates the constitutional pro-
scription against double jeopardy. 200 A nominally "civil" sanction
constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes if it is retributive,
punitive, or deterrent in nature.20' States must impose such sanctions
during the first proceeding, or not at all.202 Despite its civil label, the
Drug Dealer Liability Act is the "functional equivalent" of a criminal
prosecution, because it has both deterrent and punitive purposes.20 3
be violated if the court measured the chance that any one of the defendants supplied the
injury-causing drug by the number of potential tortfeasors. Id. See supra notes 106-11
and accompanying text.
198. The Act does not contain a provision that apportions damages among defen-
dants according to their share of the illegal drug market. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch.
740, § 57/25(c) (West Supp. 1996). Further, during a House floor debate, Representa-
tive Salvi acknowledged that the theory of liability employed in the Act is distinct from
judicially crafted market share theories, which do apportion damages. HOUSE
TRANSCRIPT, supra note 138, at 5.
199. See supra notes 174-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the irrational
presumption created by the Act.
200. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution provides: "[N]or
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V. See supra part II.E.2 for a discussion of the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
201. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989); People v. Towns, 646
N.E.2d 1366, 1368 (I11. App. 2d Dist. 1995), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. In re P.S.,
661 N.E.2d 329 (I11. 1996).
202. Department of Rev. v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (1994).
203. See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1948. A tax imposed under the Montana
Dangerous Drug Tax Act was the "functional equivalent" of punishment in part because it
had an obvious deterrent purpose and imposed a high rate of taxation out of proportion
to the government's actual damages. Id. The Drug Dealer Liability Act also has an
obvious deterrent effect and imposes liability out of proportion to the government's
actual damages attributable to the defendant's conduct. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, §
57/10(3) (West Supp. 1996) (recognizing the Act as an additional deterrent to drug
dealers); id. § 57/25(a)(4) (allowing recovery by governmental agencies for injuries
caused by a drug user, even if there is no proof that a particular defendant sold drugs to
that user). However, because the Act creates a nominally "civil" cause of action, it cir-
cumvents guarantees afforded defendants in criminal proceedings, such as the "guilt-
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt" standard, and the right to counsel. See U.S. CONST. amend.
VI; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970) (holding that the Constitution requires the
prosecution to prove a criminal defendant's guilt with respect to each essential element
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Deterrence and punishment of drug dealers are functions which should
be left to the criminal justice system.2' 4
The Illinois legislature clearly intended for the Act to deter and pun-
ish drug dealers, not just to serve as a remedial measure.20 5 The
legislature's intent to deter drug dealers is captured in its declaration:
"Although the criminal justice system is an important weapon against
the illegal drug market, the civil justice system can and must also be
used . . . . The persons who have joined the illegal drug market
should bear the cost of the harm caused by that market in the commu-
99206nity.
beyond a reasonable doubt); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (indigent
defendants in state criminal prosecutions have a right to have counsel appointed for
them).
204. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 448. "'Retribution and deterrence are not legitimate
nonpunitive governmental objectives."' Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
539 n.20 (1979)).
205. HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITEE REPORT, supra note 1I; see supra note 138. Addi-
tionally, lawmakers may have been spurred to pass the Drug Dealer Liability Act as a
means of funding law enforcement activities, because civil forfeitures-traditionally
used to finance drug investigations-have been dwindling. See Gary Heinlein, Drug
Sellers Deal Blow to Seizures, DET. NEWS, Sept. 18, 1995, at Cl. Police report that
money from drug seizures-which they use to finance drug investigations-is leveling
off or shrinking as drug kingpins lease cars, put fancy homes in the names of relatives
unaware of their illicit enterprises, and find other ways to avoid property seizures. Id.
Drug sellers also have begun laundering their money in ways more difficult to detect. Id.
Wayne County Sheriff Robert Ficano, the first to bring suit under the Michigan Drug
Dealer Liability Act, stated that law enforcement officers have to "become just as
innovative" as the drug dealers. Id. Ficano noted that one such "innovation" is the Drug
Dealer Liability Act, under which he sued and received an $8 million judgment from two
convicted drug dealers. Id. Proposed changes to civil forfeiture laws may also make it
more difficult for law enforcement agencies to seize drug-related property. See Jan C.
Greenburg, Hyde: Ease Recovery of Seized Property, CH. TRIB., June 22, 1995, § 1, at
14. United States Representative Henry Hyde has introduced a bill which would place the
burden of proof on the government in civil forfeiture proceedings, so that property
owners would no longer be required to prove their innocence in order to get their prop-
erty back. H.R. 1916, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The bill also creates a right to
counsel for indigent property owners in civil forfeiture proceedings. Id.
206. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 57/10(2) (West Supp. 1996). In Kurth Ranch,
the Court held that it was beyond question that the Montana legislature intended the tax
to deter people from possessing marijuana, because the Act's preamble clearly stated
that the tax would provide funding for anti-crime programs by "burdening" criminals
rather than "law abiding taxpayers." Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1946-47. Similarly, it
is also indisputable that the Illinois legislature intended the Drug Dealer Liability Act to
have a deterrent effect. The legislature clearly stated that the Act "serves as an additional
deterrent to a recognizable segment of the illegal drug network," particularly small-time
dealers who are likely to be deterred by the threat of liability under the Act. ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 57/10(4) (West Supp. 1996). The legislature determined that
"[s]ome new entrants to retail illegal drug dealing are likely to be deterred even if only a
few of these suits are actually brought." Id. § 57/10(12).
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The punitive intent of the statute can be seen in both the legislative
findings and the legislative history of the Act. The Act's findings
state: "The persons who have joined the illegal drug market should
bear the cost of the harm caused by that market in the community. 2 °7
During a House debate, the Act's sponsor stated that the Act was the
equivalent of "a cop onevery block. We will have individual Attorney
Generals [sic] making sure that drug dealers do not profit from their
illegal activity." '
The effect of the Act is also punitive. Damages allowed under the
Act would substantially exceed the amount needed to make the plaintiff
whole for the damage, if any, caused by the defendant. 209 The Act
expressly creates a right to recovery for governmental entities that
expended money on behalf of a drug user, without any showing that
the defendant actually caused the government's pecuniary injury. 210
Under an identical provision in the Michigan Drug Dealer Liability Act,
for example, the Wayne County Sheriff's Office recovered nearly $8
million from two convicted drug dealers for funds spent on behalf of
drug-addicted prison inmates.21' Concededly, these damages are
207. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 57/10(2) (West Supp. 1996).
208. HOUSE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 138, at 20.
209. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 452 (1989). In Halper, the defendant's
liability under the Act was $130,000, even though the government's actual damages in
investigating and prosecuting the false claims amounted to only $16,000. Id. The dis-
parity between the government's actual expenses and the defendant's potential liability
under the Act was sufficiently disproportionate that a sanction under the Act constituted
a second punishment for double jeopardy purposes. Id. Arriving at the precise dollar
amount at which a sanction accomplishes its remedial purpose but not a punitive effect
involves an element of "rough justice." Id. at 449. However, where the defendant's
liability is exponentially greater than the government's actual losses, the liability con-
stitutes punishment. Id. Two defendants sued under the Michigan Drug Dealer Liability
Act by the county sheriff's office were found liable for almost $8 million, even though
there was no proof that this amount equaled the damages, if any, that the defendants actu-
ally caused to the plaintiff. Default Judgment Against Gwendolyn Y. Clemons and David
H. Richow at 3, Ficano v. Clemens, No. 95-512918 (Cir. Ct. Wayne County Mich.
1995). There appears to be nothing in the Illinois Act which would prevent such a large
award. See infra note 215 and accompanying text. The Act expressly provides for the
imposition of punitive damages. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 57/25(c) (West
Supp. 1996). Million-dollar damage awards which go well beyond, or are totally
unrelated to, the damages actually caused by a defendant should be considered sufficiently
disproportionate to constitute "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes.
210. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 57/25(a)(4) (West Supp. 1996). The Act pro-
vides: "One or more of the following persons may bring an action for damages caused by
an individual's use of an illegal drug ... (4) A medical facility, insurer, governmental
entity, employer, or other entity that funds a drug treatment program or employee assis-
tance program for the individual drug user or that otherwise expended money on behalf of
the individual drug user." Id. (emphasis added).
211. Mediation Summary of Plaintiff Robert A. Ficano at 8, Ficano v. Clemens, No.
95-512918 (Cir. Ct. Wayne County Mich. 1995).
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remedial in the sense that they compensate the government for its
actual loss. However, upon deeper analysis, the punitive nature of the
sanction becomes apparent. The sheriff's office did not offer proof
that the defendants actually sold drugs to any of the prison inmates
upon whom it had expended funds. 1 2 Rather, it was presumed that,
because the defendants were convicted of selling drugs in the same
area, some of the inmates must have purchased drugs from the defen-
dants.1 3 However, because there was no proof that the harm caused
by a particular defendant sued under the Act equaled the sheriff's
million-dollar injury, the sanction is thus punitive as applied to that
defendant. 214
There appears to be nothing which precludes an Illinois court from
awarding such a large judgment. 2 5 Thus, under the Illinois Act, a
defendant can be criminally convicted and subsequently subjected to a
"civil" lawsuit for damages totally unrelated or disproportionate to the
defendant's conduct.1 6 This provision presumably would allow the
212. Gentilozzi, supra note 86, at 6.
213. Id.
214. See supra note 180 (stating that in 1994, more than 14,000 people were arrested
in Illinois on drug related charges). The chances that any random defendant who
happens to fall within the Act's three broad requirements actually caused the plaintiffs
injury are minimal. See supra notes 187-94 and accompanying text.
215. The Illinois legislature recently adopted tort reforms, which, among other
things, place a $500,000 cap on non-economic damages and limit punitive damages.
See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 735, §§ 5/2-1115.1(a), 5/2-1115.05(a) (West Supp.
1996). It is clear that the tort reform legislation was intended to apply to actions
brought under the Drug Dealer Liability Act. See HOUSE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 138, at
4. However, the caps on punitive damages do not apply if the defendant has previously
been criminally convicted for the act upon which civil liability is based. ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. ch. 735, § 5/2-1115.05(d) (West Supp. 1996). Thus, where the drug dealer
has already been criminally punished for his acts, there would be no limit placed on the
plaintiffs recovery of punitive damages.
216. Although Halper and the other cases discussed in this section all involve civil
sanctions sought by the government, some commentators have suggested that civil
suits by private litigants where punitive damages are imposed should constitute
"punishment" for double jeopardy purposes. See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HORNBOOK
ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 77, at 275-78 (1935) (discussing the argument that imposing
punitive damages on a defendant in a civil suit and subsequently criminally prosecuting
him violates the "spirit," if not the letter, of the Double Jeopardy Clause). Here, private'
plaintiffs bringing suit under the Act may be viewed as arms of the state, in that they
perform a general law-enforcement function. See HOUSE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 138, at
20. A private plaintiff who recovers punitive damages under the market share provision
of the Act cannot be viewed as merely vindicating a violation of his own right, because
he has not proved that the defendant was the one who violated that right. Rather, the Act
authorizes the private plaintiff to "punish" the defendant for conduct that is detrimental
to the public as a whole, but not the cause of the particular plaintiffs injury. Such a
scheme is more akin to criminal than civil liability. THOMAS HOLLAND, ELEMENTS OF
JURISPRUDENCE 328 (12th ed. 1917). Thus, an argument could be made that the Double
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Illinois Attorney General's Office, local State's Attorneys offices, or
local police departments to sue a drug dealer. 17 The defendant in such
a scenario would be forced to defend against the State's charges in two
different cases, which the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits. 18 The
Act has a clear remedial purpose, 219 but it still constitutes "punish-
ment" under the Double Jeopardy Clause because it serves both
deterrent and punitive functions. 220 Therefore, the Act cannot con-
stitutionally be applied to drug dealers who have already been crim-
inally punished for their acts.22'
B. The Act's Lack of a Causality Requirement Abrogates
Fundamental Tort Principles
The Act abandons concepts that courts traditionally employed to
ensure fairness to defendants in civil cases.222 In Illinois and else-
Jeopardy Clause is implicated when a defendant with a criminal conviction is required to
pay punitive damages to a private plaintiff who sued under the market share provision of
the Act. Additionally, the Act also contemplates the involvement of law enforcement
officials in suits involving private plaintiffs, as in the requirement' that drug user
plaintiffs reveal all their knowledge of the illegal drug market before they are allowed to
recover. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 57/30(a)(1) (West Supp. 1996); see also
Hawaii Drug Dealer Liability Act, HAw. REV. STAT. § 4-36-663D-4(d) (1995) (requiring
that drug-user plaintiffs turn over 25% of their recovery to the state for deposit into a
general fund).
217. The Act expressly allows governmental agencies to sue for their own damages.
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 57/25(a)(4) (West Supp. 1996). A similar law in
Oklahoma expressly provides that a prosecuting attorney may represent the State or a
political subdivision of the State in an action under the Drug Dealer Liability Act. OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2-434 (West Supp. 1996). Although the Illinois law does not con-
tain such a provision, there appears to be nothing to prevent a prosecuting attorney, or
any other law enforcement official, from litigating on behalf of a governmental agency,
as in the Michigan case. See supra part IL.D for a discussion of this case.
218. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959). The underlying principle of
the protection against double jeopardy is that "d person shall not be harassed by succes-
sive trials; that an accused shall not have to marshal the resources and energies neces-
sary for his defense more than once for the same alleged criminal acts." Id. at 198-99;
see also Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). "Fear and abhorrence of govern-
mental power to try people twice for the same conduct is one of the oldest ideas found in
western civilization." Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 151.
219. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 57/5 (West Supp. 1996). One stated purpose
of the Act is "to provide a civil remedy for damages to persons in a community injured as
a result of illegal drug use." Id.
220. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989).
221. Id. Under the Double Jeopardy Clause, "a defendant who already has been
punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction
to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but
only as deterrent or retribution." Id. at 448-49.
222. One commentator poses the question underlying causation principles as the
following: Given that we value the freedom of action of both plaintiff and defendant,
what is true of the defendant in particular that entitles the injured plaintiff to call upon
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where, well-established principles of causation require that there be
some reasonable connection between the defendant's act or omission
and the plaintiff's injury.223 The Illinois Drug Dealer Liability Act
abolishes these principles, giving private citizens the right to "punish"
the defendant for conduct that is detrimental to the public as a whole
but not the cause of the particular plaintiff's injury.224 Under tradi-
the defendant's assets? JUDITH J. THOMSON, RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK 199-202
(1986). If anything about the defendant sufficed for this entitlement, the plaintiff could
call upon anyone at random for compensation. Id. This prospect would be disruptive of
freedom of action. Id. Thus, causality matters because it supplies the particular feature
about the defendant that singles him out from everyone else. Id. When the plaintiff
makes a claim against the defendant, it is presupposed that these particular persons have
been linked together through causation. Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing,
63 CmI.-KENT L. REV. 407, 428-29 (1987). The concept of "wrongful loss" is inherently
relational, because to describe plaintiff's loss as wrongful is to implicate the action of
the person who inflicted the injury. Id. at 433. The victim is wronged only because the
injurer has wronged him. Id. Tort law incorporates the relational aspect of wrongfulness
by requiring the victim to be compensated by the tortfeasor. Id. The process of rectifi-
cation thus mirrors the process of injury. Id. Just as the connection of tortfeasor and
victim is essential to wrongful loss, so this connection is essential to the way tort law
annuls this wrongful loss. Id.
223. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 938 (Cal.) (Richardson, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). It may be argued that between an innocent
plaintiff and a negligent defendant, the defendant should bear the loss for all the conse-
quences of his wrongful conduct. ROBERT E. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS
21 (1963). However, our system of jurisprudence does not permit holding wrongdoers
liable for all the consequences of their acts. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note
33, § 41, at 264. Rather, tort law redresses only those injuries which "proximately" re-
sult from a defendant's culpable conduct. Id. The concept that liability may be imposed
based merely on a breach of duty, without causation being established, has long been
rejected in American tort law. Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 344 (Ill.
1990). As Judge Learned Hand stated: "[S]o long as it is an element of imposed liability
that the wrongdoer shall in some degree disregard the sufferer's interests, it can only be
an anomaly, and indeed vindictive, to make him responsible to those whose interests he
has not disregarded." Sinram v. Pennsylvania R.R., 61 F.2d 767, 770 (2d Cir. 1932).
Thus, in order to recover, the plaintiff must show a violation of her own right, not
merely a wrong to someone else. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y.
1928). Proof of negligence "in the air" is insufficient. Id. at 99. As Justice Cardozo
stated in Palsgraf, "Life will have to be made over, and human nature transformed," if
persons were held liable for all consequences of their conduct. Id. at 100.
224. No case before Sindell ever imposed liability based solely on the notion of
punishing wrongful conduct without first establishing causation. Cynthia L. Chase,
Note, Market Share Liability: A Plea for Legislative Alternatives, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV.
1003, 1018. The idea of punishing a wrongdoer solely on the basis of wrongful conduct
resembles criminal rather than civil liability. HOLLAND, supra note 216, at 328.
Blackstone described the difference between tort and crime as follows: "[Torts are an]
infringement or privation of the private, or civil, rights belonging to individuals, con-
sidered as individuals; crimes are a breach of public rights and duties which affect the
whole community, considered as a community." Id. The plaintiff in a civil action does
not sue derivatively, or by right of subrogation, to vindicate an interest invaded in the
person of another. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101. The plaintiff in tort sues for breach of a
duty owing to himself. Id.
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tional tort law principles, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
proximately caused his or her injury in order to recover.2 ' The exis-
tence of a causal nexus between a plaintiff's injuries and a defendant's
conduct has been an indispensable element of tort law.226 It is well
settled that "negligence in the air," where the defendant has committed
a wrongful act but has not injured the complaining party, is an insuffi-
cient basis upon which to impose liability. 2
The causation element in traditional tort law serves several important
functions.228 The causation requirement separates culpable parties
from innocent actors 229 and ensures that culpable parties are held liable
only for harm they have actually caused. 230 If courts held people liable
for all unintended harms flowing from their acts, the legal conse-
quences would be disproportionate to fault.231 The causation principle
also ensures a just result in legal disputes.232 Societal interests at stake
225. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 33, § 41, at 263. "An essential ele-
ment of the plaintiff's cause of action for negligence, or for that matter any other tort, is
that there be some reasonable connection between the act or omission of the defendant
and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered." Id.
226. See, e.g., Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 117 N.E.2d 74, 78 (I11. 1954). Before
liability will be held to exist, the plaintiff's injury must have a direct and proximate
connection with the defendant's conduct. Id. It is the existence of this cause and effect
relationship which makes the negligence of the defendant actionable. Id. at 79.
Professor Weinrib asserts that even though causation is under attack in American law in
ways unimaginable a generation ago-as with the proliferation of market share and
alternative liability theories-these attacks do not undermine the conceptual centrality
of causation in tort law. Ernest Weinrib, The Special Morality of Tort Law, 34 McGILL
L.J. 403, 407 (1989). Professor Weinrib states: "Even in a case like Sindell, causation
is still present in our thinking, just as one can have a sensation of a limb now ampu-
tated. Only because we recognize that causation is fundamental for tort law does the
attenuation of that requirement in the Sindell case become a matter of celebrity." Id.
227. In order to recover, the plaintiff must show a violation of her own right, not
merely a wrong to someone else. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100.
228. Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 329 (111. 1990). "The identification
element of causation in fact serves an important function in tort law." Id.
229. Payton v. Abbott Labs., 437 N.E.2d 171, 188 (Mass. 1982).
230. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 33, § 41, at 267. "Proximate cause"
is merely the limitation which the courts have placed upon the actor's responsibility for
the consequences of his conduct. Id. at 264. Limitation on the scope of liability is
related to policy, in particular, what justice demands or what is administratively
efficient. Id.
231. KEETON, supra note 223, at 20.
232. Henry W. Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 343, 345 (1924). Professor
Edgerton notes:
The reason underlying the run of doctrines and decisions on legal cause I
believe to be simply a desire to reach a result which is in some sense just.
Courts refuse to recognize all actually-caused consequences as legally caused,
not chiefly because of doubt as to what is actually caused nor because there are
only twenty-four hours in the day, but because it would seem unfair in many
cases, and monstrous in some, to hold people responsible for all consequences
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in legal disputes include the freedom of individual action, general
security, the advancement of knowledge, and the importance of indi-
vidual human life.233 Courts strike a balance between these competing
interests by holding defendants liable for the normal and direct
consequences of their acts, and leaving the burden for more abnormal
and indirect consequences with the injured party.234 Courts have
struck this balance in light of the fact that today's plaintiff may be
tomorrow's defendant.235 It may be better for the plaintiff to forego
recovery for an injury suffered today, thereby escaping the possibility
of an unlimited and ruinous liability tomorrow. 6
Some may argue that drug dealers create an unreasonable risk of
harm to the general public when they choose to participate in the illegal
drug market and should therefore be culpable for their actions. 23 7 It
has long been recognized in this State, however, that the creation of
risk or breach of duty alone, without proven causation, provides an
insufficient basis upon which to impose liability.23s In Smith v. Eli
Lilly & Co. ,239 the Illinois Supreme Court admonished that this impor-
tant principle should not be ignored "merely because the defendants are
members of the drug industry., 240  The Smith court found it
"tempting" to impose liability based on the fact that the drug companies
profited from the sale of a drug which may have been responsible for
which actually result from their wrongful acts.
Id. at 345. As an example, Professor Edgerton cites the law's treatment of alternative
causes, where the plaintiff's injury would have occurred even if the defendant had not
committed a wrongful act. Id. at 346. In such a case, our sense of justice demands that
the defendant not be held liable. Id. at 347.
233. Id. at 349-51.
234. Id. at 351. For example, if D were to negligently or intentionally knock down
A, and, before A could get up, X, acting alone, seized the opportunity to kill A by kick-
ing him in the face, few courts would think it just to hold D liable for A's death. Id. at
350.
235. Id. at 352. Even from the point of view of the plaintiff, the system of legal
cause as it exists may be justified as "mutual insurance." Id. The average plaintiff may
be just as likely to commit wrongs, at least negligent wrongs, as the average defendant.
Id. Thus, the plaintiff's interests are also served by limiting liability for the conse-
quences of wrongful acts. Id.
236. Id. at 352.
237. It is sometimes argued that justice always falls on the side of holding the
wrongdoing defendant liable for all the actual consequences of his conduct, because the
alternative would be to leave the innocent plaintiff to bear the cost of the injury. Id. at
349.
238. Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 344 (I11. 1990).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 340; see supra part II.B for a discussion of the drug industry's role in the
origins of market share liability.
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the plaintiff's damages.2"' Nevertheless, the court held that this temp-
tation was not a strong enough reason to adopt a theory which signifi-
cantly altered tort law while only providing a "markedly flawed" alter-
native with unclear ramifications. 24 2 The same admonishment applies
here.
Of course, the Drug Dealer Liability Act has considerable popular
appeal.243 However, public sentiment should not dictate whether fun-
damental fairness principles inherent in our justice system apply to
certain groups. Throughout history, public sentiment has often
resulted in unfair treatment of unpopular persons who are viewed as
"morally" culpable.244 Over time, emotions usually give way to
reason, and the logic used to distinguish those persons is discred-
ited.245 However, as Justice Douglas has noted, when the witch hunt
is on, one who must rely on logic or reason "leans on a feeble
reed. 246
241. Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 342.
242. Id. The court noted that imposing liability based on a defendant's perceived
wealth would be an unsound principle that would result in a two-tiered system of justice.
Id. "A system priding itself on 'equal justice under law' does not flower when the
liability as well as the damage aspect of a tort action is determined by a defendant's
wealth." Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 941 (Cal.) (Richardson, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
243. Sue? You Bet Your Life, PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 27, 1995, at 12A. "The selling
point of the Drug Dealer Liability Act is the promise of instant riches for average
citizens. If you can't win the lottery or get rear-ended by a Rolls driven by someone
with insurance, maybe you can strike it rich from a crook." Id.
244. See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (upholding a statute
which permitted New York school teachers to be fired based on their associations with
the Communist Party); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding
Japanese internment during World War I1); 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988 and Supp.) (excluding
persons from the United States based on their ideological beliefs, associations, or affili-
ations with alleged terrorist organizations, even though they have never committed a
terrorist act).
In 1984, a California district court vacated Fred Korematsu's conviction for violating
the containment order. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal.
1984). In 1988, Congress passed the Japanese Internment Act, acknowledging the fun-
damental injustice of Japanese internment during World War II, providing monetary
compensation to Japanese-Americans, and apologizing to them on behalf of the people
of the United States. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1989b-7, 1989b-9 (1992).
245. For example, in the heat of the "Red Scare," the Supreme Court upheld a statute
allowing New York public school teachers to be fired based on their associations with
the Communist Party. Adler, 342 U.S. at 490. The majority view in Adler, however, has
since been discredited. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605
(1967) (recognizing that constitutional doctrines which emerged after Adler had
"rejected its major premise"). See also supra note 244 (discussing Congress' recogni-
tion of the unfairness inherent in World War 1I internment camps based on a person's
Japanese ancestry).
246. Recent acts of terrorism have inspired unfair treatment of foreigners. See
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Because of public frustration over the nation's drug problem, drug
dealers have apparently become the latest target.247 Indeed, there is
nothing wrong with creating innovative ways to make drug offenders
"pay" for their wrongful acts. 248 The Illinois legislature should not,
however, abrogate fundamental tort principles that ensure fairness to
all litigants. Embarking on this road can only lead to unjust, and
unconstitutional, results.249
Keisha A. Gary, Note, Congressional Proposals To Revive Guilt By Association: An
Ineffective Plan To Stop Terrorism, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 227 (1994). Recent amend-
ments to the Immigration and Nationality Act exclude persons from the United States
based on their ideological beliefs, associations, or affiliations with alleged terrorist
organizations, even though they have never committed a terrorist act. 8 U.S.C. § 1251
(1994); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (1988 and Supp.).
247. According to a nationwide poll, three out of four Americans have been touched
personally by the nation's drug problem. Michael McQueen & David Shribman, Battle
Against Drugs Chief Issue Facing Nation, Americans Say, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 1989,
§ I, at 1. Forty percent of blacks and 15% of whites surveyed said they believed that
almost all the crimes committed in their neighborhoods were drug-related. Id. Many
respondents said they were willing to try "almost anything" to solve the drug problem.
Id. One member of a Wall Street Journal focus group suggested putting drug offenders on
"an Island right out in the Pacific." Id. Another member suggested putting users "in
concentration camps for a while." Id.
Another poll found that 62% of Americans are willing to surrender "a few of the
freedoms we have in this country" to solve the drug problem. Jack W. Germond & Jules
Witcover, Public Reaction to Drug Problem Nears Hysteria, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept.
12, 1989, at 8A. Two-thirds of respondents said they would approve of police stopping
cars at random to search for drugs, even if it meant that cars of law-abiding citizens were
sometimes searched by mistake. Id. More than half supported mandatory drug tests for
all Americans. Id.
Fear and frustration over the nation's gang problem has recently led to unconstitu-
tional treatment of gang members. See City of Chicago v. Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d 34
(Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1995). In Youkhana, an Illinois appellate court struck down a
Chicago ordinance which made it illegal to loiter on a public street with a known gang
member. Id. at 41. The court found that the ordinance prohibited gang members from
loitering because they were gang members, not because they were loitering. Id.; see
also Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 8, City of Chicago v. Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d 34
(I11. App. 1st Dist. 1995) (No. 93-3909) (arguing that the ordinance was unconstitution-
ally based on an assumption that gang members, if standing in a public place, will
commit illegal activities).
248. For example, the Manhattan District Attorney's Office created an innovative
and successful program to curb drug trafficking in urban apartment buildings. See Peter
Finn, The Manhattan District Attorney's Narcotics Eviction Program, NAT'L INST. JUST.,
May 1995, at 2. Under the program, the district attorney's office brings actions to evict
drug dealers under the state's Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law. Id. The law
does not require the district attorney to prove that the tenant committed a specific crime.
Id. Rather, the district attorney need only present evidence warranting the conclusion
that the premises are being used for an illegal business. Id. Between June 1988 and
August 1994, the program removed drug dealers from 2005 apartments and retail stores.
Id.
249. As one court has stated, "[O]ur constitutional standards, fortunately, do not slide
up and down a scale according to the gravity of the crime problem [the state] wish[es] to
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V. PROPOSAL
A. A Constitutional Alternative to the Drug Dealer Liability Act
While the current Act may be unconstitutional, the legislature may
still create a civil cause of action against drug dealers by basing the
action on traditional elements of recovery in tort law. 250 The legisla-
ture must eliminate the "market share" aspect of the law, because it
unconstitutionally requires defendants to pay 100% of the damages for
injuries that they more than likely did not cause. 25' Allowing plaintiffs
to sue for injuries actually caused by someone else abrogates important
causation principles designed to ensure fairness to civil litigants.252
Additionally, the legislature must eliminate the provision allowing a
governmental entity to recover damages with respect to defendants
who have already been criminally punished. 3 This provision consti-
tutes a second punishment for double jeopardy purposes, because it
allows the government to recover an amount well beyond, or even
totally unrelated, to the damages actually caused by the defendant.2
A law requiring the plaintiff to show causation would allow third
parties to recover for their injuries while preserving defendants' due
process rights. 5  Such a statute would supply a presumption that the
drug dealer is liable for the foreseeable results of his drug-dealing.
This presumption is rational, and thus constitutional, unlike the current
law.256 The proposed statute codifies the principle inherent in common
combat. If it were otherwise, the fundamental ideals on which this country is based
would slowly deteriorate." Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d at 42-43. See supra part IV.A for a
discussion of the law's unconstitutionality.
250. In particular, the legislature should require the plaintiff to show some reason-
able connection between the act or omission of the defendant and the damage which the
plaintiff has suffered. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 33, § 41, at 263.
251. See supra part IV.A.I.
252. See supra part 1V.B.
253. See supra part IV.A.2. If the defendant has not been criminally punished, the
government is free to seek a civil judgment against him under the Drug Dealer Liability
Act. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 450 (1989). The Halper Court stated
that "[n]othing in today's ruling precludes the Government from seeking the full civil
penalty against a defendant who previously has not been punished for the same conduct,
even if the civil sanction imposed is punitive." Id.
254. See supra part IV.A.2.
255. See Bronfin, supra note 31, at 353. The proposed law would also ensure that
defendants are only held liable for injuries that have a reasonable connection with their
acts. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 33, § 41, at 263. To be sure, it
remains a steep challenge to prove causation in this context, but due process requires
such proof.
256. See supra part V.A. The presumption created by the proposed act is rational
because there are a wide number of known effects of drug use. See infra notes 264-67 and
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law negligence: that one who harms another when he breaches a duty
of care should compensate the victim for his injuries.25 7 The proposed
law would simply apply the rationale behind dram shop laws to the
sale of illegal drugs. ! At common law, for example, bar owners
were not liable for injuries caused by their intoxicated patrons because
"the consumption, not the sale or service of alcohol, was viewed as the
259sole proximate cause" of the injury. States enacted dram shop laws
to cure inadequacies in the common law and allow innocent third
parties injured by intoxicated persons to recover against the bar owners
who served the alcohol.2 6 Similarly, a law creating civil liability for
illegal drug dealing would cure inadequacies in the common law and
allow innocent victims to recover from drug dealers.26'
In order to recover, the plaintiff should have to prove (1) that the
defendant's illegal drugs were used by the person who injured him,
and (2) that those drugs contributed to the person's actions that
resulted in his injury.262 The plaintiff must establish not only that the
drug user who injured him used the defendant's drugs, but that the
drug use increased the likelihood that the user would injure others.263
Drug use causes a wide range of recognized, foreseeable consequences
to the drug user, including cardiac failure, cerebral hemorrhaging,
psychosis, depression, and even death.2 4 Injuries to third parties are
accompanying text. Thus, it is foreseeable that the person to whom the dealer sells
drugs will be injured or will cause injury to others as a result of the drug sale. Id.
257. Bronfin, supra note 31, at 354. State and federal laws already establish that
individuals owe a duty to refrain from selling drugs. Id. The proposed statute would
impose civil liability on persons who breach this duty, if that breach proximately
caused the plaintiff's injury. Id.
258. Id. at 353.
259. Id. at 352 (citing El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Tex. 1987)).
Under this rationale, it would seem that third parties injured by a drug user could not
recover from the person who sold them the drugs. Id.
260. Bronfin, supra note 31, at 353-55 (citing Montgomery v. Orr, 130 Misc. 2d
807, 813 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986)). The Montgomery court noted: "There seems to be little
rationale to say that it is a crime to ... [violate alcohol control laws] ... for which you
may be fined and/or imprisoned, but that you cannot be held civilly liable for doing so."
Id.
261. Bronfin, supra note 31, at 353.
262. Id. at 354. The proposed law would also be an improvement over the common
law for two reasons. Id. at 353. First, it would allow innocent victims to recover for
their injuries. Id. Under common law doctrines, such persons can only recover directly
from the drug user, who may lack financial resources. Id. Second, the proposed statute
could effect the legislature's goal of deterrence. Id.
263. Id. at 354.
264. Id. at 360 (citing Ian R. Tebbett, A Pharmacist's Guide to Drugs of Abuse, 134
DRUG ToPics 58 (1990)). At common law, the link between a drug sale and an injury to a
third party would likely be seen as tenuous. Id. However, this reasoning is no longer
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also foreseeable, as drug use is known to incite criminal activity26' and
negatively affect judgment, motor reflexes, and coordination.266 Such
a law would not differ dramatically from dram shop laws, which hold
bar owners liable for the acts of intoxicated patrons, based on the
known effects of alcohol use.267
Traditionally, courts have barred adults from recovering for injuries
caused by their voluntary, illegal acts.268 The proposed statute should
continue the common law rule that adult drug purchasers cannot
recover for their injuries.2 69 Although some courts have observed that
drug addicts do not "voluntarily" purchase drugs, the law should not
allow drug users to recover for their own deliberate, illegal acts.2
Allowing adult drug users to recover would eradicate the deterrent
value of forcing them to bear the costs of their own injuries. 27' Fur-
ther, granting drug users a cause of action would create a "safety net"
that would ensure their ability to use illegal drugs safely.27 Neverthe-
less, the proposed statute should allow underage drug users to recover
from the person who sold them the drugs. Unlike adult drug pur-
chasers, children are less able to comprehend the risks of using illegal
persuasive in light of advances in medical knowledge and increased public awareness of
the effects of drug use. Id. The proposed statute should recognize the increased knowl-
edge about the dangers of drugs and regard drug sales as a potential proximate cause of
injury. Id.
265. For example, roughly 25% of inmates convicted of murder in 1989 were under
the influence of illegal drugs when they committed the crimes. ALLEN J. BECK, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROFILE OF JAIL INMATES, 1989, at I.
266. Bronfin, supra note 31, at 361-62.
267. Id. at 353.
268. Id. at 358. For example, one court refused to allow a woman to recover from a
pharmacist who provided prescription drugs to her husband, because her husband had
illegally forged the prescriptions, in which the court held:
[A] person cannot maintain an action if, in order to establish his cause of
action, he must rely, in whole or in 'part, on an illegal or immoral act or
transaction to which he is a party, or to maintain a claim for damages based on
his own wrong or caused by his own neglect . . . or where he must base his
cause of action, in whole or in part, on a violation by himself of the criminal
or penal laws ....
Id. (citing Pappas v. Clark, 494 N.W.2d 245, 247 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992)).
269. Bronfin, supra note 31, at 360.
270. Id. at 359.
271. Id. at 360. As one court has noted, "shifting legal liability tends to diminish an
individual's sense of personal responsibility for the consequences of his own conduct."
Id. at 359 (citing Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Todd, 813 P.2d 508, 518 (Okla. 1991)
(Opala, C.J., concurring)). In the dram shop context, courts have noted that allowing
adult alcohol purchasers to recover for their own injuries would be "tantamount to creat-
ing a no-fault law for intoxicated persons." Bronfin, supra note 31, at 359 (citing Allen
v. County of Westchester, 492 N.Y.S.2d 772, 776 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)).
272. Bronfin, supra note 31, at 360 n.60.
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drugs.273 Due to their immaturity, children are likely incapable of
making truly "voluntary" decisions about drug consumption.2 74 Thus,
their drug use would not break the chain of causation.275
The proposed statute should also continue to allow recovery by
governmental entities that suffer pecuniary injury as a result of drugs
sold by the defendant. The legislature, however, must amend the cur-
rent law to permit the government, where the defendant has already
been convicted, to collect only damages shown to be caused by that
defendant. Any amount which extends beyond making the govern-
ment whole constitutes a second punishment for double jeopardy pur-
poses and cannot constitutionally be applied to defendants who have
already been criminally punished.
276
B. Restitution for Victims of Illegal Drug Dealing
Existing restitution statutes could also be employed to provide com-
pensation for persons injured by the illegal drug market. Under resti-
tution statutes, courts are authorized to require the defendant to com-
pensate his victim for actual out-of-pocket expenses as a part of his
sentence.277 An order requiring the offender to make restitution serves
the dual goal of making the offender responsible for his or her action
and making the victim whole.278 Courts have invoked restitution as a
criminal sanction since colonial times. 9 In Illinois, the restitution
statute provides for compensation for persons who suffer pecuniary or
273. Id. at 263. Under similar logic employed in dram shop laws, minors' use of
alcohol does not break the chain of causation, because it is presumed that minors are
incapable of making informed, voluntary decisions about alcohol use. Id. It has been
argued that adolescents have more difficulty than adults in perceiving risks associated
with alcohol use. Id. at 358 n.53 (citing Larry T. Patterson et al., Young Adults'
Perceptions of Warnings and Risks Associated with Alcohol Consumption, II J. PUB.
POL'Y & MARKETING 96 (1992)).
274. Bronfin, supra note 31, at 363.
275. Id. at 363 n.78.
276. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 450 (1989). The Court's decision does
not "prevent the Government from seeking and obtaining both the full civil penalty and
the full range of statutorily authorized criminal penalties in the same proceeding. In a
single proceeding the multiple-punishment issue would be limited to ensuring that the
total punishment did not exceed that authorized by the legislature." Id.
277. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/5-5-6 (West 1992), amended at Pub. Act No.
89-198 § 20, 1995 I11. Legis. Serv. 2481-84 (West), Pub. Act No. 89-203 § 15, 1995
I11. Legis. Serv. 2550-53 (West), and Pub. Act No. 89-428, § 280, 1995 I11. Legis. Serv.
4104-06 (West).
278. People v. Lowe, 606 N.E.2d 1167, 1173 (I11. 1992).
279. See David L. Roland, Progress in the Victim Reform Movement: No Longer the
"Forgotten Victim," 17 PEPP. L. REV. 35 (1989).
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personal injury as a result of the criminal acts of the defendant.28
Under the statute, the court can order the defendant to compensate the
victim for out-of-pocket expenses, losses, damages, and injuries
caused by the defendant.28' The court cannot order the defendant to
pay such damages as attorney fees.282
The restitution statute applies to both victims of violent crimes and
victims of nonviolent crimes. 283  Thus, persons who suffer either
pecuniary or personal injury as a result of drug-dealing could be com-
pensated.284 The victim could seek restitution from either the drug
user or the drug dealer. Moreover, an order making the offender
responsible for restitution is a sanction that is proportionate to the
crime, and thus, the offender is not deprived of due process.285
VI. CONCLUSION
With the adoption of the Drug Dealer Liability Act, the Illinois legis-
lature has shown that if one hits a square peg hard enough and often
enough, it will fit into a round hole, even though the board may be
splintered in the process. 286  In its desire to compensate persons
280. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/5-5-6 (West Supp. 1996).
28 1. Id. § 5/5-5-6(b). Imposition of restitution in a criminal proceeding does not
foreclose any civil remedy the victim may have. Id. § 5/5-5-6(i).
282. People v. Harrison, 402 N.E.2d 822, 825 (I11. App. 4th Dist. 1980).
283. People v. Lowe, 606 N.E.2d 1167, 1172 (III. 1992). The Lowe court noted that
the focus of the restitution statute is the victim, not the civil interests of the criminal.
Id. at 1173. The victim has already suffered emotional and financial trauma and should
be spared the additional expense, delay, and stress of civil litigation. Id.
284. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court has rejected due process challenges to the restitu-
tion statute. Id. In Lowe, the defendants argued that the order of restitution deprived
them of their due process rights, "because the purpose of the probation system is to
rehabilitate the offender, not to serve as a tool for the imposition of civil liability." Id.
at 1172. The court has held that although the purpose of the Code of Corrections is to
rehabilitate offenders and return them to useful citizenship, it also serves to prescribe
sanctions proportionate to the offense. Id. at 1173.
285. The defendant's due process rights are protected because the trial court must
determine whether the victim's claim is legitimate, based on information provided in the
presentence report. Id.; see ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730, § 5/5-3-2(a)(3) (West
1992). If the offender claims that the presentence report is inaccurate, the trial court will
conduct proceedings to determine whether the report is accurate. Lowe, 606 N.E.2d at
1173. A further protection is that the court, as in all proceedings, must consider the par-
ticular circumstances of the case to ensure that the restitution order is "appropriate and
just." Id.
286. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 940 (Cal. 1980) (Richardson, J.,
dissenting). Justice Richardson encapsulates the faulty logic behind market share
liability as follows:
Plaintiffs have been hurt by someone who made DES. Because of the lapse of
time no one can prove who made it . . . . Plaintiffs have suffered injury and
defendants are wealthy. There should be a remedy. Strict products liability is
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injured by the State's drug problem, punish drug dealers, and perhaps
even tap a funding source for drug law enforcement, the Illinois legis-
lature has lost sight of important constitutional principles. The Illinois
Drug Dealer Liability Act is unconstitutional and should not be allowed
to stand. Nevertheless, the legislature can and should enact a statute
allowing recovery against drug dealers which employs traditional
requirements of recovery in tort-requirements which ensure fairness
to every litigant. Such a measure may not have the popular appeal of
one which allows "instant riches" for average citizens. 7 However, it
would provide compensation for innocent victims of the illegal drug
market, while protecting the due process guarantees afforded to every
member of society, including drug dealers.
WENDY STASELL
unavailable because the element of causation is lacking. Strike that
requirement and label what remains . . . 'market share' liability, proving
thereby that if you hit the square peg hard and often enough the round holes
will really become square, although you may splinter the board in the process.
Id. at 939-40.
287. Sue? You Bet Your Life, supra note 243, at 12A.
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